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PRICE PARITY IN AGRICULTURE UNDER PLANNED ECONOMY
Section I
Introduction
In ancient times the farmer raised enough crops for
his own immediate needs* He was satisfied to provide food
for his family and for his stock* What he produced over and
above his own needs, he could sell in order to purchase
machinery and the necessities of life* As time progressed,
by the substitution of machinery for manual labor, he was
able to produce not only sufficient for his own needs, but
also a surplus for which there was a demand* This supply
gave him a purchasing power which enabled him to procure
what he needed* Although the income from the goods which
he sold was sufficient to enable him to buy the commodities
and services which he required, yet he was only able to make
a bare living. When the price he received for his products
lagged behind the prices he had to pay for his needs, the
purchasing power of his income steadily declined. Out of
such a crisis has grown the need for some form of economic
plan. Our problem is to discover what kind of plan can
establish security and raise standards of living in propor-
tion to productive capacity*
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2leaning of Planned Economy
The idea of planning or developing our country through
some carefully thought out plan is called planned economy or
social control. The term, planned economy, is a broad one.
It is a method whereby we bring about further control of
economic activity in an orderly manner. It attempts to achieve
a new social and economic order by directing and mapping out
paths in our country, state, and nation. In fact it transcends
national borders and becomes world-wide. It concerns major
social and economic problems and deals with political questions,
national policy, and internatj onal cooperation. The idea of
planning or developing our country through some plan carefully
thought out and called planned economy or social control is
not particularly an American concept. Old ideas on planning
have arisen out of efforts to discover a formula that will
create a system which will direct production, distribution,
and consumption, towards the economic well-being of all and
give the answer to the question, "what kind of economic planning
can end unemployment, establish security, and raise standards
of living in proportion to productive capacity. M Under our
economic order, we have no security for workers. Even in
so-called prosperous times great numbers of our population
are living in poverty. Our failure to utilize more than a
part of our productive machines even in good times had led to
enforced idleness. Economic society has never been stable.
While some industries are advancing, others, because of various
' 33 0; 06
;
* -
t'
.
?; + x 5 i " r r; ii •. 30 o
.
-
.
•
-
3- " X x ; / V • ' > 3; r . tt* XcTn'c r oo ; a i: • o:j
i 3 t
g j
-
0q j[ ioo
*
_
<
t
.
•
H,
#
30 .u 3' 'VO - • I iOA 9V * OJ. ,30*
:
- saufioocf t et9ftto ' Q i
3factors, are making little progress. Though many industries
enjoy a year round business, many others are faced with
seasonal changes in demand. In addition, observers have
noted that at fairly regular periods (periods averaging
about three and a half to four years) , mild economic storms
occur which impede business activity.
As economic institutions developed down through
the years, it became apparent that we have been very backward
in accommodating the national laws which govern us to our
developing necessities. We should reap the full benefits
of the natural developments of mass production and mass dis-
tribution and by intelligent governmental regulation prevent
all abuses, particularly those abuses following faulty pro-
duction and price manipulation.
Furthermore, controls must accomplish their social
objective without the sacrifice of the essential liberties
which are basic to a system of free enterprise operating in
response to the profit motive and functioning through free
markets.
Both previous to 1933 and since that date, there
has been a desire on the part of many farm organizations to
depend on the government for a solution of their troubles.
Past history proves conclusively that governmental price
fixing has resulted in failure in many cases. However, at
present all evidence points to an expansion of control in
farming, encouraged by offering the farmer further subsidies.
.o--
. ; j
.
A f * -J
'
‘
'
• • a
'
. c . . Ou* . '-o
o • ; , 'X i . '• ; • •
.
V) : ;• • - =»: X. 0 : I ‘ ' - *-
-
.
.!'
..
> o:
'
’
.
'
r> ). t^o " I ; r.\ •• '« .0 o- ’': . ;• : t-'X;' os ..
;, i
... -
.
X r * :••}
.
;r
*
' j ' •
. .
.
•
;
• t :
#
.
• '•
'
•
.
„
;• » a - > • •»
'
4Up to the present writing no evidence has been shown by
government officials that they possess the necessary knowledge
to see all the possible ramifications of these control
schemes, and what is still more important, to devise effective
safeguards against all the adverse results.
Purpose of the Thesis
The object of my thesis is to show that any attempt
to bring agriculture into parity by planning is rather a
hopeless task. This is proved by noting the increased
costs of the things which the farmer must purchase. This
increase is a result of both higher wage scales and limited
output by industry. Planning has resulted in a surplus of
wheat and cotton and a threatened surplus of corn, despite
five years of attempted production control.
Work Done by Others
Agricultural colleges and governmental institutions
have been long aware of the need of real research, and
studies of the farm problem in relation to methods of ad-
justing prices have been made by the following institutions:
Department of Agriculture, Washington, D. 0.
The Social Science Research Council of 230 Park
Drive, Hew York City
The Cornell Extension Bulletin, published by the
Hew York State College of Agriculture, at
Cornell, Ithaca, Hew York
The General Education Board to the American Council
on Education, with headquarters at the University
of Chicago
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5The Brookings Institution at Washington, D. 0,
The Food Research Institute, Stamford University,
California
Reasons for Study of the Problem
Though the government has been spending lavishly
for five years, the farmers* problem is still unsolved.
In the period, beginning 1933, the government has spent
three billion dollars, has used organization, persuasion,
and compulsion, and has tried experiment after experiment
in an effort to solve this problem. The problem is this:
there are but six million farmers. in the United States; yet
these farmers must provide sustenance for the other one
hundred twenty four million Americans. These farmers are
capable of producing more wheat, cotton, tobacco, livestock,
and other products than the consuming public can absorb with
its existing income. In the past, surplus products have
found an outlet abroad, but now other nations, because of
war demands, lack of dollars, demands of their own colonies,
or because of other reasons, raise barriers against much of
the American surplus. Under the circumstances, how are
American farmers to find markets that will provide them with
the income to which they have been accustomed, or how are
they to adjust their operations, that they will escape from
this pressing economic problem?
the
As/result of the calamitous drop in farm prices in
1932 and 123, because our farmer foreign markets suddenly
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6shrank and purchasing pcmer of city workers decreased, the
farmer found himself with huge unsold surpluses. Congress
decided to regulate the production of farm crops by means
of control, in which subsidies were the main weapon used to
bring the farmers into line. During this period, the
laissez-faire method of farming was discarded, and the
pendulum swung to the other extreme; namely government re-
gulation, in which the farmer relegated his troubles to the
government with the hope that laws would be passed to clean
up surpluses and raise the prices of farm products*
Government regulation or planned economy is cruite
popular today with some people. Planning or planned economy
is the grand panacea for our age. The Communist, ITazist,
and Fascist all use the term, each implying a different
interpretation.
As a matter of fact, all economic life involves
planning* Economic activity is activity involving the dis-
posal of scarce goods; and the disposal of goods necessarily
involves some kind of plan* The consumer spending his
income, the investor deciding how much to save and in what
lines to invest it, are all planning*
Price Parity
Price Parity under Planned Economy implies nothing
more or less than government intervention in the economic
system* It is an attempt to reestablish farm prices to
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7farmers at a level that will give agricultural commodities
a purchasing power with respect to articles that the farmers
huy, equivalent to the purchasing power of agricultural
commodities in the base period, 1910-1914*
Government interference in price control may take
the form of (l) determination of price without controlling
supply or demand; (2) control over supply or demand; (3)
simultaneous control of supply, demand, and price. The first
may be described as direct price fixing, the second indirect
price fixing, the third combines both direct and indirect
methods in order to attain the most effective control.
The American Agricultural Act*
The A. A. A. was an example of indirect price fixing;
the N* R. A, was more concerned with direct price fixing;
while the conservation methods adopted in the United States
during the World War, represents the third method of control*
Price fixing can be undertaken either by the govern-
ment or by private agencies* While private price fixing of
industrial products has been properly criticized, the govern-
ment has proceeded to fix the prices of other products,
mainly agricultural. In some instances, the excuse for such
governmental action has been the professed need to offset
the effects of private price fixing* In the past, however,
government price fixing has usually been a supplement rather
than a substitute for private actions*
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8Mercantile Theory
The attempt of governments to control price did not
begin with the depression in 1929. Regulation of industry
and commerce appeared back in the 17th century and was known
as the Mercantile Theory. It permitted one form or another
of regulation of nearly every business and laissez-faire
relationship.
At the end of the 18th century, this economic phi-
losophy of the Middle Ages was discarded and the pendulum
swung to the other extreme of the arc, when the doctrine
of laissez-faire was born. Just as unlimited freedom of
thought and political action was preached as the social
salvation of mankind, so unlimited business competition was
to be the sole solution of the economic problem of every
nation.
This doctrine of laissez-faire, is more or less a
surrender to the ancient law of survival of the fit. It
holds that unregulated competition would furnish society
its goods and services at the lowest possible cost. It holds
that the individual knows his own self-interest better than
any one else including the government can know it, and that
he follow it; that the pursuit of his own interest by the
individual also promotes the public interest; and that com-
petition furnishes its own restraints. From these assumptions
was deduced the argument that any interference with the
operation of so-called natural economic laws not only would
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9fail to benefit society, but would likely be injurious.
End of Laissez-Faire
This era ended about the end of the 19th century and
as the years of the 20th century advanced our new industrial
machine became marvelously efficient. The motors of mass
and machine production raced merrily in times of ascending
activity, to give employment and increased enjoyment of
products to all. But the engine had neither engineer nor
fly wheel. It turned out tons of output with little regard
to the power of its human parts to consume its products.
When the channels of production clogged with unconsumed
surplus, the whole machinery stalled.
The peaks of prosperity became higher and steeper,
but the valleys of depression grew deeper and wider; the old
cushions for depression, new horizons of free land, were gone.
Men clung to the doctrine of unlimited competition and
individual laissez-faire long after the conditions to which
it was suited, vanished.
The crash of 1929 and the lean years that followed
it, at last thoroughly awakened this nation and the world to
the startling necessity to temper the raw doctrine of laissez-
faire with the old age lesson of our race; that we must not
lie down dumbly under the destructive effect of natural laws.
We must stand up and apply human intelligence to its adapta-
tion as mankind did to the glacial age; to flood, fire, famine
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and pestilence; to storm, drought and earth quake. Every-
where in western civilization, this attempt is being made
in every guise from Communism to Capitalism. As in all such
periods of distress, the tendency is to go too far, and at
a pace too headlong.
Desire to Regulate Industry
It is human nature to do this, - to rush from a
freezing at the ice of laissez-faire to regulate nothing, to
the other extreme of regulating everything. To regulate
everything in a country of the size and complexity of ours
is an infinite task for which there is little experience.
President Wilson, in giving instruction for an immense indus-
trial regulation under the stress of war, laid down a rule
which was at least successful, ''to leave alone what is being
well done, to administer that which is ill."
Without the ingenuity of the American people to
prevent abuses of private economic power and the recurrence
of these wide swings, can we be satisfied to "sweat it out"
under the ancient doctrine of laissez-faire? Every year it
becomes more certain that we cannot leave the material
welfare of 130,000,000 people to the vagaries of every economic
wind that blows.
I believe that the moving forces of mankind are:
acquisitiveness, the urge to function as an individual, a
yearning for freedom in mind and body, and above all, the
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constant quest of opportunity to advance. These are attri-
butes to individualism.
The combination of these separate incentives to
workers among 130,000,000 people are the motors that run our
economic machine. In correcting uneconomic areas and polic-
ing vast concentrations of economic power for maximum
public service and minimum abuse, we must preserve to the
utmost individual initiative and individual freedom and in
the least possible degree, restrict opportunity for in-
dividual advancement. These have ever been and ever will
remain the dynamos of all our progress.
What is the alternative to the incentive of the
hope of individual gain and advancement? Clearly, it is
the fear of punishment, or compulsion by the state.
To activate our economy, we can rely on the profits
system and the hope of gain, or we can try the new European
ideas of state regulation and the fear of punishment. We
can try either - but we cannot try both at the same time.
Section II. Planning
Pioneers
An examination of modern planning must needs take
into consideration the background whence springs our present
economic structure. Such an examination must take into
account the Platonic theory which evolves into the Modern
Fascist State, and consider also the theory of Sir Thomas
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More, whose Utopia, published in 1516 7 advocated common
ownership of land, and the limitation of hours and labor.
With the end of agricultural feudalism, especially
after the French revolution which destroyed the dream of
an agricultural social stability, ideas of planning turned
more and more toward industry. Such was the character of
the group organization proposed by Fourier, the industrial
Christianity of Claude Henri de Saint-Simon, the coopera-
tives of Robert Owen, and, finally, the horizontal self-
organization of industry proposed by Walter Baltenau.
It is always an economic crisis which stimulates
interest in the idea of economic planning or control and
its practice. Theorists and practitioners hope that
economic balance, and simultaneously, social balance may
be attained through economic planning which will reconcile
consumption with production; unstability with stability;
in favor of ai organization guaranteeing economic and social
security.
Modern Foreign Planning. Germany
Germany, in her war time economy initiated by
Balthenau, has given the clearest example of restrictive
planning in modern times. Scarcity of products gave rise
to a plan for rationing labor forces and material. The
war destroyed many millions of labor forces, intensifying
unproductive, constant capital, and the use of this capital
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for unproductive war purposes* The technical capacity of
Germany* s economy was not utilized for reproduction of
needed economic value, but on a large scale, for net con-
sumption without reproduction*
Organizers and directors of the war time plan could
attain neither a true control nor a true coordination of
production, distribution, and consumption. The reason for
this inability to control and coordinate, was the impossi-
bility of fulfilling an economic plan while maintaining
the old economic conditions*
The war ended for Germany with a loss estimated at
150 billion gold marks. In reality, the loss was much
greater, and the entire burden of external and internal
debts and credits was perhaps equal, to the money value of
the so-called national wealth. A high and even higher
percentage of the national income was spent for interest,
and to support the growing organization of the loss in the
form of state administration, to meet the demands of un-
employment, the defense of capital against the productive
forces, and other burdens. The destroyed constant capital
in agriculture and other parte of the economy is system,
the railway system, the mercantile fleet, buildings, and
roads was reconstructed by using increasing credits, while
the rising debt service and the use of percentage for net
consumption weakened more and more the reproductive forces,
that is, the internal market.
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Since it was impossible either to utilize the technical
capacity for regular economic purposes or to abandon even
a part of the technical apparatus, a large part of the popu-
lation turned against this apparatus, that is, against
constant capital, in discord with variable capital. That
is to be considered the economic cause of National Socialism
or German Fascism. The economic idea of the National
Socialists is the idea of a planned economic system, with
necessary concessions to industry, commerce, and money capital,
preserving capitalistic private property.
The New York Times of October 31, 1938 has an article
in which it quotes their correspondent as saying that Germany
evolved a planning board. To quote “The industrial agri-
cultural and business development of Nazi Germany along
natural economic divisions is controlled by a national
planning Inard set up by Chancellor Hitler. 11
The central power reposes in the Reich, which is
divided into 23 regions, each with its own planning board
representing all phases of human activity in the region,
social, economic, political, administrative and academic.
“It is one of the major objectives of National
Socialist Government to eradicate the archaic features of
its political framework and to establish major regions
that can function as effective units of economic and social
life in which the rich regional variations of the national
cultural heritage may reach their fullest expression.”
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In each planning region the chief planning authority
is the supreme representative of the Reich. To show the
scope of the program, Dr. Dickinson quotes Hanns Kerol,
head of the national planning board, as saying that funda-
mentally the board will direct all economic changes in the
Reich, on a basis of planning and foresight, if in the common
interests of the people and state*
In this connection, the Minister was quoted as
saying that three great problems may be emphasized; a
thorough clearance of the urban agglomerations in the
industrial areas and great cities, a legacy from the un-
regulated, planless growth of the past; the planned
penetration and economic development of those regions that
heretofore have been relatively neglected and unprotected;
and finally, the working out of comprehensive plans, such
as organically must emerge from the guiding tenets and the
principles of planning by the State, if they are to find
logical application for the common good of the people and
state*
Russia
The most comprehensive of all plans for state control
of the economic system is that known as the Russian Experi-
ment* In the early days of the Revolution complete Communism
was attempted. The use of money was abolished and a certain
number of goods and services were provided free of charge*
From the failure of this experiment has grown an all-embracing
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plan which now determines the economic life of Russia.
The planning system of Russia is subjected to
criticism from the workers, the combined production units
and the Central Planning Commission. Under the guidance of
this Commission, production is undertaken either directly
by the state or by cooperative organizations under its general
control. Wholesale trade is organized by industries, each
industry being responsible for its own raw materials, for
marketing its finished products, and for regulating its
finance. The individual production units, selling their
output to the industry have no direct control over buying or
selling prices, nor over costs such as wages. Furthermore,
they have no direct interest in the emergence of profits or
losses, though they are urged to cover costs and show a
surplus.
Retailing is practiced by a number of large organiza-
tions. The most important of these are the Cooperative
Societies of Consumers and State 8hops. The State Shops are
under state control, as the private trader has been eliminated
with the last ten years. This method of control has been of
little benefit to the consumer, however, for various reasons.
First, the cost of production has been inclined to exceed
the planned estimates, while the output and quality of finished
goods has not measured up to expectations. A second disad-
vantage to the consumer has resulted from concentration on
capital goods, particularly on heavy industries. Such
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v enforced savings by the community whose minor luraries and
i even necessities have been retrenched -has been necessary for
the future expansion of industry. Vast new plants have been
built utilizing the most modern technique, and these have
provided a remarkable output of capital goods.
Labor* s share in the proceeds of production is larger
in Russia than in capitalist countries, as there is practi-
cally no enterpreneur class nor profits; and it is more
arbitrary, since a state undertaking need not necessarily
cover its costs. Unemployment is practically non-existent,
since the scale of planned production is large enough to
absorb all able bodied members of the community, — women as
well as men. The direction of labor into the channels
necessary to attain planned production is for the most part
achieved by the ordinary economic incentives of differential
wage rates, supplemented by special rationing privileges.
There is, however, an increasing tendency to discourage the
movement of workers from one concern to another. Also, as
a last resort, the planning authority has the power to
conscript labor.
The intense development of the capital goods industries
has made it difficult to produce and distribute adequate
supplies of consumption goods. Some benefits such as educa-
tion, medical attention, and nursery schools axe provided
free of charge. After years of experiment, other benefits
are distributed by a combination of controlled and uncontrolled
V; .CO oXcr
* M-«
r • i Imsmioo ric yd 3 rtJtva 9
091 i '
.
’
. ... o
.
. .
.
• .0 u: : r r v O'.
. .
1
-x ;*o : or.'/
Cr
•
•
•
.
-
t -no .
0$ dguone e - .....
. n- ; v - *
,
.
.'. r . 1, > .. o'
-9«-..od X • XX. •. '.::v,c
*
&Q( e . I ; • ••• l t . 00 >1
.
' '
. ,
.
... rri .
.
'£ J t*. ' O
ji.rj-K % r : 00' 1 . . O 9 ^ J . cX'. V -1) .;0.'. .
r : '-''i *: ; " JX o • ' j ..
•
•
•
".or
' . . . J : X . ' e
'
.
•
; ••'0;v • •£> ' X ov: j o; o ‘:o ’ ’vx o : y t :viO':r cX? f)':
18
rationing and prices. This rationing has a two-fold purpose:
namely, to provide for certain groups, who are either poli-
tically desirable or industrially important (shock workers,
highly skilled engineers) goods which are not easily procured
elsewhere; or which cannot be bought as cheaply as the fixed
ration price; and also to distribute, generally, goods which
are in great demand, but of which the supply is inadequate.
Soviets believe that capitalist countries cannot plan
for plenty, because perfection of production produces a sur-
plus. This surplus lowers prices; lowered prices reduce
profits, and disappearance of profits results in idle factories
and unemployment.
In Russia, where resources and means of production
are publicly ov/ned, planning is for use, not for profit; for
plenty, not for scarcity. Socialist planning may be compared
to the planning problem of a great American corporation. For
example, an enterprise which owns land may grow cotton,
process it, and sell the factory products. Information may
come to the executive officers from the several farms, plants,
and warehouses. This information is checked by accountants
and arranged by statisticians. It forms an important basis
for the policies decreed by the executives. These policies
are then passed along to the subordinate superintendents and
sales managers who may request restriction in one department
or suggest increased output in another in order that the
whole program may move forward with its component parts
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properly aligned.
Planning is similar in every sort of production, dis-
tribution of goods and services in the Soviet Union. In
one instance, Soviet planning may appear to be easier then
planning in a single industrial corporation, since most of
the factors entering into the calculations and decisions are
controlled, not subject to the guess work in which a private
enterprise may indulge because of the price system.
On the other hand, Soviet planning involves many
difficulties not encountered by a business corporation,
because of the magnitude and maximum complexity of the under-
taking. For example, let us consider the manner in which the
All Union Planning Commission (dosplan) operates. Information
concerning stocks of goods and materials, capacity and
available number of workers comes to the central planning
authority from individual farms and factories, from industrial
trusts, from the planning boards of the republics and other
political subdivisions of the country. This huge mass of
material is arranged, digested, and formulated into a
tentative national economic plan which is then sent to every
official down the line. This plan becomes the subject of
debate for workers, managers, cooperatives, collective
farmers, trade unionists and government experts. The con-
clusions drawn from these debates form the nucleus of the
draft plan which is then modified where desirable, submitted
to the Communist Party for endorsement, and finally presented
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to the Congress of Soviets for enactment.
Gosplan is a body of seventy specialists who have
proved their abilities in regional planning. Its members
are divided according to various necessary fields and func-
tions, such as industry, housing, and education of future
planners. The entire organization including accountants,
statisticians, scientists and clerks numbers 4,000 people.
Social and economic planning form the crux of the
Soviet undertaking. They are its reason for existence,
its hope for progress, and its broadening influence.
The whole system of Economic Planning in Russia
depends on the success or failure of the five year plans.
The plan attempted to industrialize the country and to make
it independent of world capitalism; to transfer small and
scattered agriculture to the trend of large scale collective
farming; and finally to organize and equip against military
intervention. This project was made possible only by the
social ownership of land, other natural resources and all the
principal means of production.
Since all the goals attempted w ere not reached, a
second five year plan was instituted. Its object was to use
the basic industrial and agricultural equipment which had been
provided. The investment which had involved so much sacrifice
must begin to produce. The machine industry must now turn
out machines and the stream of consumption goods, — food,
clothing, household utensils, bicycles, and radios must in-
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crease in volume.
This Plan aimed at lowering the costs of production
enough so that retail prices might be reduced by 35 per
cent. ^ This reduction of cost was to be effected by an
increase of labor production, improved utilization of raw
materials and reduction of overhead expenses. Despite
these measures, output of consumption lagged, and this plan
ended in 1937.
The third five year plan will attempt to enlarge and
elaborate construction along previous lines, its main object
will be to promote the comfort and cultural life of the
people. Railways will be double-tracked and electrified;
new power stations will be built and industrial combines will
be further developed. Means will also be provided for mak-
ing education compulsory to the age of eighteen and more
museums, sport fields and theaters will be erected.
Italy
After the Socialist revolution of 1920 had failed
to provide a panacea for the economic ills of Italy, the
first development of the Fascist State originated. Its
essence is the legally recognized syndicate group of employers
or workers organized locally, regionally, and nationally. In
each industry these are finally fused into a corporation re-
presenting all interests concerned and insuring a cooperative
settlement of industrial problems. Contracts of wages, con-
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ditions affecting workers, the recruiting and training of
labor are negotiated by the syndicates, and though subject
to appeal to a court of law, are binding on the whole in-
dustry, No other association is permitted to function and
no other method of settlement such as the strike is per-
mitted, A central council of corporations, consisting of
appointed representatives of industry and state, fulfills
the functions of coordinating otherwise divergent policies
in the interests of the community as a whole. The Minister
of Corporations presides over this council.
One aim of Fascism is to develop an intense love of
country. This ideal is fostered by encouraging the notion
that the outside world is trying to destroy Italy by economic
means. Such attacks can only be met by devoting all the
energies of the country towards forging and using weapons
of production. Work must become the goal of human existence,
with the qualities of loyal obedience and self sacrifice
dedicated to the defense of the State,
All productive forces must be controlled and there
must be no room for class warfare. Private property is res-
pected, but is regarded as held in trust for the State to be
used in effecting the greatest social advantage. Private
food enterprise is encouraged and is guided by the State
after it is shorn of its worst defects. Individual, interests
are fostered, but subordinated to those of the group, and
the interests of the group are subordinated to those of the
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nation.
Such a policy, naturally, would include attempts to
make Italy independent of foreign supplies, of essential
goods, and services. Particular attention has been paid
to home production of wheat, which formerly was imported
to the extent of more than half her annual trade deficit.
In this "Battle of the Wheat” all kinds of devices have
been used, including the provision of agricultural credit
facilities; improvements in technique; reforms in land
tenure; and heavy import duties. Italy has apparently suc-
ceeded in becoming self-sufficient in her principal foods,
but she has paid dearly for this achievement.
The protection given to sugar beet and to sugar re-
fining, and the stimulation of the export of rice by
bounties financed by taxing the home consumption, are
other expensive forms of economic nationalism. In addition
to paying more than double the world price for these
commodities, her exports of fruit and wine must be adversely
affected by her curtailment of imports, and the diversion
of land, energy, and capital to wheat production must help
to raise the cost of dairy products. Moreover, this policy
has contributed to intensifying world over-production of
wheat. Italy, however, is carrying out logically a definite
policy, whatever its ultimate outcome.
The industrial policy of Italy has been dominated by
the problem of preserving and increasing industrial capital.
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In this way banks have been relieved of accumulated industrial
loans, industry has been freed from heavy fixed charges,
investors have been furnished with state guaranteed securities,
and savings provided with a safe and productive outlet even
in times of depression. It appears that the Government is
using these institutions to control the appropriate develop-
ment of investment. The Corporate State has the power to
prevent the entrance of newcomers or of new developments, and
it makes use of this power. On the other hand, enterprises
which secure the backing of the Corporations and the Govern-
ment sire fostered by cheap credit facilities. Incidentally,
the machinery of the Corporation is able to furnish an un-
equalled statistical basis on which to found and control a
national economic policy.
Any discussion of the general effects of this experi-
ment must take into consideration the current evolution of
the local syndicates into a few great National Corporations
whose power was at first shadowy, but which seems to be en-
croaching on that of the earlier forms. It is true that
the machinery for wage agreements has secured great flexi-
bility in the renumeration of the factors of production.
But neither the syndicate, the corporation, nor the State
directs production in a positive sense, nor accepts full
responsibility. Their powers are mainly to intervene or to
restrict. The State claims the last word in the attempt to
fix wages, profits, and interest on equitable levels; yet the
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consumer remains free to refuse to pay prices covering
such fair costs#
Public Works policies, mainly land development,
hydro-electric generation, and electrification of railways
have been carried out more to lessen the effects of the
depression than to reorganize economic life# The planning
of the Corporate State is essentially a long drawn out
conception of planned economy.
In the Corporate State controls are maintained over
agriculture, industry, and commerce. Controls over these
industries are maintained through corporations# Corporations
have been set up to control cereals, olive oil, beets, sugar,
and wine textiles, and such business projects as engineering,
credit and insurance, sea and air transportation, tourist
trade, and public entertainment.
In agriculture, the policy of the Fascists has been
to promote self-sufficiency in food stuffs. A program of
land reclamation has been adopted which includes the drain-
ing of marshes and the fertilization and colonization of the
land suitable for cultivation. In all this, the initiative
is taken by the government, though any intention to abolish
private ownership of property is denied. The most specta-
cular achievement so far, in land reclamation, has been the
much advertised draining of the Pontine Marshes near Rome.
Italy* s most successful attempt to stimulate domestic
production of food has been ”Th.e Battle of the Wheat.” In
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1925, Italy was still forced to import more than one quarter
of the wheat consumed by the population. An intensive cam-
paign was undertaken to increase the amount grown domes-
tically. This was accomplished, partly by encouraging more
scientific methods of farming, and partly by imposing a
high tariff on imported wheat. The resultant high prices
were a considerable hardship to the Italian public during
the depression years of lowered wages, but the desired goal
was attained. In agriculture, as in industry and commerce,
there has been a great deal of government supervision and
control. In fact, the way has been cleared for thorough-
going economic planning, if Mussolini decides to inaugurate
it. Certainly in time of war complete control could be
effected over night. But so far, no general plan has been
adopted for Italy; there is no Italian counterpart for the
German "Four Year Plan."
American Planning
Modern American Planning is an outgrowth of early
attempts really begun before the Civil War. Since that
time there has been an almost continuous appeal from the
farm regions that the Government enact legislation which would
furnish assistance or relief to those engaged in agriculture.
Urged on by the relatively low farm income as well as by the
growing philosophy that the government was responsible for
the economic situation of agriculture, the farming sections
have elected representatives and senators pledged to various
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agricultural relief programs. From the attempts to relieve
agricultural prices by government programs there has grown
up in later years the desire for economic planning quite
similar to that adopted in European countries. As a result
of the distressed period in American agriculture during the
first decade of the twentieth century, due to increased
disparity between the prices of agriculture and prices of
other commodities, the government, at the instigation of
farm representatives, decided to take control of the situa-
tion and to plan on a smaller basis. In order to attain
this control, the agricultural theorists had Congress pass
several measures which gave the Agricultural Bureau more or
less complete control over the production of the farmer.
These controls will be discussed in detail later, as they
help to prove, that in at least one phase of our governmental
activities, we have gone far along the road of complete
government control over agriculture. But before entering
into any discussion of economic ills affecting the farmer;
let us review the condition of agriculture in America from
the Civil War to the end of the nineteenth century.
Section III
American Agricultural Problems
A. Agricultural Problems from Civil War to 1900
During the long period following the Civil War, vast
areas of new farming territory were opened up to settlers
by the United States Government. The population of -the
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grain states (North Central division) increased by more
than 42 percent during the decade 1860 to 1870, and by
nearly 34 percent during the next decade. This represented
an addition to the population of this section of over 8,000,
000 inhabitants. The opening of new lands to settlement
stimulated immigration to such an extent that 5,500,000
persons came to the United States during the twenty years
from 1860 to 1880. A large proportion of them settled in
the Middle West. This was made possible by the extension
of the railroad system into the grain region, where new
areas were opened up for cultivation and new markets es-
tablished for the speedy and economical disposal of products.
Inventions, such as the reaper and the twine binder, made
it possible to harvest the enlarged production, while the
introduction of the roller process of reducing wheat to
flour, in the early seventies, stimulated the raising of
spring wheat, and gave an impetus to the settlement of
Minnesota and the Dakotas, where it was chiefly grown.
In the twenty years period 1880-1900, over 303,000,000
acres were added to the farm area, or a territory equal to
Western Europe with the exception of Spain. Between 1900
and 1920, a further addition of 117,000,000 acres was made.
Since 1920, however, there has been a decline.
Increase of Farm Lands
The addition of such vast areas to the improved farm
lands, and the accompanying expansion of production, was
. iiviib l&TLittBO rittxo j- :ir :'.;j
.
.
j % V . / 'V •; 0 <
' X . K : ' • I* i: J> ' Cl '
'
.*
*
*
!
" . nr. o. 'v cl .) . o '.r >.mxoc
; V r r>- •'
(Lr
f
.2 l .0 v : • . 7; t •; ,
'
'
' y v cj j jjsw «
WOff 0 c j DM01
-JO iw
P
'i ; • ViV>tX Irn •„ :r f >
.
; :a 3 j • ' -0 >: ; *
•
u 3 r;;: 1
r
’
.
v . . . ic • &£
.
. ::
-
J. .
r
' £ '
‘7- • > • v r •
-r
i . . i ; .
'•
„ y^ * ' . f * , -
'
*>.
•’
-
'
t ,
"
"
v
•
'
'
' &19
. <
1
, Ju t ; < '>
'
.
0 <
!
.
• X : .
*.4 {
.
31
not without its disadvantages. Although the United States
thereby obtained a leading position in the international
grain trade as a producer and exporter of foodstuffs, the
expansion involved the partial disorganization of agriculture
in the Eastern States and caused dissatisfaction in the
West itself. So eager were the settlers to acquire land
on such favorable terms that the securing of farms proceeded
more rapidly than was justified by the economic demand for
the products they raised. Thus, a great overproduction
occurred, especially of wheat, and prices were greatly
depressed. In many cases, perhaps in the majority, crops
were grown at a loss; the rise in the value of the land,
being originally free, was counted as the real reward.
This overproduction was caused, not only by the too rapid
extension of cultivated area, but also, by the great improve-
ments in agricultural machinery.
The application of machinery to agriculture, which
had begun before the war, was now made on a more extensive
scale. Host of the new inventions had to do with cereal
production. It was estimated in 1880 that over 10,000
patents had been granted in this country up to that time.
Increase of Per Capita Production
The per capita production of the country as a whole
increased from about 5.S bushels in 1860 to 9.2 bushels in
1880. The total value of farm implements and machines at
twenty year intervals has been as follows:
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1360 ....
1880 ....
1900 . . . .
1920 ....
1925 ....
As a result of the introduction of agricultural machines
and implements, grain production has shown an enormous
increase* Growth of cereals, which is the most important
branch of agriculture in the United States, represents
more than one half the total value of all the improved
farm land. There are seven cereal crops which are grown
in considerable quantities. In the order of their impor-
tance, they are: corn, wheat, oats, barley, rye, buckwheat
,
and rice. The increase in the production of the first five
cereals, during this period, is shown in the following table.
Production of Cereals 1360 - 1920
Year Kaize Wheat Barley Rye Buckwheat
1860 838.8 173.1 15.3 15.5 17.5
1370 760.9 287.7 29.7 16.6 10.3
1880 1754.6 407.8 43.9 19.8 11.8
1890 2122.3 809.2 78.3 23.6 9.1
1900 2666.3 943.3 119.6 25.5 11.0
1910 2552.1 1007.1 173.3 29.5 14.8
1920 2786.2 1526.0 202.0 59.3 13.7
During the first half of this period, most of the
particularly ingrain came from new land which was opened up,
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Minnesota, the Dakotas, Nebraska, Kansas, Texas, and Oklahoma.
However, during the latter half, the increase in grain has
come rather from the gradual rise in acre yields, while the
acreage planted to corn, wheat, oats, and potatoes increased
slightly over 150 percent between 1885 and 1925; the total
production expanded over 175 per cent, showing a growth in
the yield per acre.
It is difficult to say how much of this increased pro-
duction is due to the use of machinery, and how much is due
to the larger acreage under cultivation; to better methods
of cultivation; to the use of fertilizers, better seeds,
crop^ rotation and other factors. An investigation was made
some years ago by the Department of Labor to determine the part
played by machinery in the development of agriculture. The
following deductions were drawn: the amount of man-labor
requisite for producing forty bushels of yellow corn, husked,
leaving the stalks in the field, was just under 39 hours by
the hand methods of 1855, and slightly over 15 hours by the
machine method of 1894; to produce twenty bushels of wheat
required 61 hours in 1830, and 3 hours in 1896; to harvest
one ton of timothy hay required 21 hours in 1850, but slightly
under 4 hours in 1895. At the same time, the cost of corn
was reduced from $16.34 to $6.62; the cost of wheat from
$4.00 to $1.12; and the cost of hay from $1.92 to 63^. Within
the following thirty-five years, further improvements reduced
the man-power needed still more, or to put it the other way,
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a given amount of man-power plus the use of machinery will
result in sizeable increase in the production of crops. It
would be impossible to plant, cultivate, and harvest the
enormous crops of today without the aid of machinery. The
crops obtained are also of better quality; for hay, corn,
and small grains may be harvested quickly, without injury
or waste; and also, the work of threshing wheat and ginning
cotton is done in a cleaner fashion.
Results of Increased Production
Several momentous consequences have followed from
this great increase in productivity. Since less man-power
has been needed on the farms, a great deal of labor has been
released for other pursuits. This surplus man-power has
sought employment in the development of manufactures. Con-
sequently, a steady migration of the unemployed from the
country to the city has resulted in a redistribution of the
population, a readjustment of social organization and of
living conditions. The proportion of the population living
in towns of eight thousand inhabitants or over has increased
from 16 per cent in 1860 to nearly 44 per cent in 1920.
At the same time the size of the average farm has expanded
from 133.7 acres in 1880 to 148.2 acres in 1920, since it
became possible to operate a larger farm unit with the help
of machinery and the use of surplus man-power which was
formerly needed to raise our foodstuffs. The average area
of improved farm land cultivated by each farm worker in-
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creased from 32 acres in 1370 to 49 acres in 1925, or
slightly over 50 per cent. Whereas, in 1790 the labor of
about 80 per cent of the population was required to raise the
food and agricultural raw materials for the nation, less
than one-third of that amount is required today. The
labor released naturally gravitated to the cities, where it
was absorbed by industrial and commercial activities. It
has been estimated that machine farming has released ap-
proximately 27,000,000 workers from agriculture between
the years 1850 and 1920.
The increase in farm products produced has resulted
in a large agricultural surplus which produced a disastrous
drop in prices and consequent discontent among the farmers.
The demand for staple agricultural foodstuffs does not in-
crease rapidly because of the limited capacity of the human
to consume it. Consequently, the larger production could
be sold only at lov/er prices. Between 1867 and 1878, the
gold price of corn fell from 57 cents a bushel to 32 cents,
that of wheat from $1.45 a bushel to 78 cents, while that
of cotton fell from 19 cents a pount in 1866 to 8 cents.
In 1894 the prices of these three articles were respectively,
46 cents, 67 cents, and 7 cents. If currency prices were
taken, the decline would be much greater, llany of the
farmers, who had perhaps mortgaged their farms to buy land
or equipment while prices were high, were now faced with
financial ruin, and the loss of their land. Seeking a cause
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for their misfortunes, they fastened the blame on the
currency legislation, the bankers, the railroads, and other
monopolies; the tariff, taxation, and other factors which
seemed to them to be responsible for their plight.
After the Civil War, Congress adopted a policy of
currency contraction which caused a fall in prices from the
dizzy heights of war inflation. Since the farmer was a
producer and a debtor, he was adversely affected by lower
prices. He believed that the renewed inflation of currency
and higher prices would be one cure for his economic ills.
The farmer had been accustomed to borrow from the banks or
from eastern capitalists, if he wished to buy his farm,
or when he needed to equip or stock it. When prices of his
products fell, he was frequently unable to meet the interest
payments, and his mortgage was foreclosed. Therefore, the
bankers and t he capitalists constituted for him a vague
nmoney power" which he distrusted and despised. Even when
he succeeded in keeping his land and in meeting his obli-
gations, the western farmer was firmly convinced that the
profits on his grain and other products were being absorbed
by high railroad charges, or by middlemen who stood between
him and the consumer. Therefore, he demanded lower railroad
rates and a reduction of handling charges. Though the
tariff raised the prices of the articles which the farmer
bought, it did not help him to secure a better market for
his products. He grieviously resented the high and unequal
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taxes and the waste and corruption which existed in
governmental circles* He decided to organize, and see if
something could "be done to improve conditions*
Attempts to Remedy Conditions. Granger Movement
The first organized effort to remedy these various
grievances of the dissatisfied farmers by separate political
action was known as "The Granger Movement It had its
origin in the formation of the “Patrons of Husbandry”; a
group which had for its primary purpose, the improvement
of the social and economic position of the farmer. As a
means to economic betterment, it sought to eliminate some
of the middlemen 1 s high charges by cooperative buying and
selling; and also to r educe railroad charges by obtaining
legislation prescribing lower rates. The only outlet for
the large agricultural surplus seemed to be in foreign
markets, which could not be reached by the western farmer,
since the railroad charges absorbed all his profits. The
Granger laws which were passed by Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin,
and Minnesota were intended to establish uniform and reason-
able rates for transporting and warehousing grain and other
products. They also required the publication of rate
schedules. At first the railroads refused to obey these
laws but accepted them in 1875, after the Federal Supreme
Court (in the important case of Munn vs. Illinois) upheld
their constitutionality, and the power of the state to
regulate the chargee made by a common carrier. The public
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did not benefit from these decisions until later, because
as a result of the panic of 1873, two-fifths of the rail-
roads of the country were in the hands of the receivers,
and their immediate problem was not low rates, but rates
which would permit the roads to survive*
Greenback Party
In 1876, the “Greenback Party” was formed. They
demanded a repeal of the Resumption Act, the abolition of
bank notes, the substitution of paper money for legal
tender. Many of the farmers were attracted to this move-
ment which promised higher prices by inflating the currency.
They believed that if the currency were inflated, the price
of steers would rise, and at the same time, that the public
debt would be paid. Checked by President Grant* s veto
of the Inflation Bill of 1877, the Greenback Party steadily
lost ground and finally disappeared after the election of
1884. However, the demand for cheap money was not so
easily disposed of, since it found expression in the Bland-
Allison Silver Act of 1878 and the Sherman Silver Purchase
Act of 1890. Both of these acts authorized the Secretary
of the Treasury to purchase, each month, a certain amount
of silver for coinage into money. Since this provided for
some inflation of the currency, or at least, a stoppage
of contraction, it found general support among the western
farmers.'
Arguments in favor of these acts placed much emphasis
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upon the burdens borne by the farmers. It was stated that
the increase in mortgage indebtedness was greater than the
increase in wealth derived from agriculture: in Kansas 60
per cent of the taxed acreage was under mortgage in 1890;
in Nebraska 55 per cent; and in Iowa 47 per cent. Corn
was so cheap that it was burned for fuel in many places;
likewise, wheat was left unharvested or fed to the stock.
In 1894 it sold in some places for 41 cents a bushel on the
farm. Naturally, to farmers operating under such conditions,
the platform of the Populist party made a strong appeal.
This party was formed by the amalgamation of the Farmers
Alliance with several other organizations. It nominated a
candidate for the Presidency as a third party in 1892 and
obtained 22 votes in the electoral college.
Improvement in Agricultural Conditions
In 1896 the farmers began to see the end of the long
stretch of agricultural depression. The great surplus of
farm products, which had exerted such a depressing in-
fluence on prices, was absorbed in increasing measure by the
rapid increase in population; so that, by 1900, the domestic
requirements nearly equalled the capacity of the country to
produce the needed food supply. 1
1. Economic History of the United States - Shannon, p. 448.
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Representative Farm Crop Prices 1833 - 1915 ^
Corn - Cents Wheat - Cents
Years per bushel per bushel
1866-75 46.9 105.3
1876-85 39.5 92.0
1886-95 36.7 67.3
1896-00 28.2 65.7
1901-05 44.1 71.6
1906-10 51.0 85.9
1911-15 59.7 87.5
The Production of Five Principal Crops 1860
Year Corn Wheat Rice Cotton
(500 bales)
1000 bu. 1000 bu. 1000 bu. 1000 bu.
1860 883,793 173,105 106,279 3,841
1870 1,094,255 235,885 54,889 4,025
1880 1,717,435 498,550 111,869 6,357
1890 1,460,406 378,097 136,800 8,562
1900 2,505,148 602,708 253,139 10,123
1910 2,866,260 635,121 680,839 11,609
1915 2,994,793 1,025,801 804,090 11,192
1919 2,811,302 967,979 1 ,166,259 11,421
1920 3,208,584 833,027 1 ,446,289 13,440
Cotton - Cents
per bushel
9.1
9.1
7.7
7.1
9.0
11.3
10.2
• 1920
Wool
1000 lbs.
66,265
162,000
232,500
276,000
288,837
321,363
285,726
298,258
287,079
1 Economic History of the People of the U. 3. Shannon, p. 448
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B. American Agricultural Problems 1900 - 1933.
Influx of Immigrants to Cities
For two decades, from 1900 to 1930, the pressure
on American agriculture was relieved. This pressure had
appeared in the eighteen eighties and had reached an un-
bearable pitch in the middle nineties. American industry
was ready for the exploitation of the home market, and
thanks to an open immigration policy, our urban population
increased at a remarkable rate. The old immigrants from
Western and Northern Europe largely, who had been attracted
to the public lands, were supplanted by the newer immigrants
from Southern and Eastern Europe. They preferred the cities.
Industry was able to absorb them and to house, clothe, and
equip them cheaply, because, at this time, it was making rapid
strides as a result of mechanization.
Increases in Farm Prices
This influx also benefited agriculture enormously.
Since mechanization on a large scale had not yet invaded the
farms, the output of farm products had not increased in
proportion to the output of other consumer goods. Neither
had it kept pace with the increase in urban population.
Frequently, agriculture found itself in that happy position
where its products were being limited to the domestic market
needs, (at least, for cereals and meat products) without
the consequent disorganized effects of lower world prices.
This situation brought about the following results: a com-
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parative decline in the rural and farming populations, a
small surplus of cash crops available for export, a compara-
tive rise in the price of farm products, and an increase in
the value of the national farm plant. Between 1900 and 1910,
the aggregate value of all cereals raised in the country
increased 19. S per cent, while the total yield increased
only 1.7 per cent. Likewise, the value of all food exports
declined from $545,474,000 in 1900 (39. B per cent of total)
to $369,088,000 in 1910 (19.1 per cent of total). Nothing
shows more forcibly the protected state of American agri-
culture during these few years than the index of farm
prices, as compared with the index for the prices of all
commodities. The following tabulation presents the figures
for selected years.
1900 - 100#
Year Prices of all commodities Farm Prices
1896 82.5 78.3
1900 100.0 100.0
1901 98.8 105.8
1905 106.3 111.6
1910 123.8 149.3
1911 118.8 134.8
1914 125.0 149.3
During the years between 1915 - 1920, various factors
helped to s end the prices of crops and agricultural lands
•\
' * 1^
K
t
' it .x- ' --
...
.
•
.
•
•
. . EtSi
.
\ : "'0 V • i » . • •• wi J. . — o S.SJi :o o:;1 -r • r*~
' r
. J*v
“I*
_ _ i i; . ~ v
i -
'
v Lute :> Oiit Q c • © '• :»
^d-iorxe /joo'V. IG ©; I. :
••
•) fo . •
(I . 0001 v,' ilo;/
.
.
•
'•
t <
..
•
•
• o Ed ...
*
.
•
Hr,
r
xc aoolx-r >..a' :;.g : ± .; : >. . j i ' .o.. r -
'
.
'
-Of :• i .
•; 0*.
w
of'l9'; io .
-
asolT^l r/ci’. iv jO j '. o . . .L- x o . 1 ; .0 Y
• \ «
v.- * •
r
.
'
oe-ox
.001 . : , ooex
.
\ * I . ... X
-i .
,
,
-
, > -
.
. • :.i m mL
i : . • X . . X
010 x
k r
«
. IX . ::ox
-
.
2 io:
^ r
• W .A. x
• .
-
.
.
•
•;.
.
. 0 ' 1 ' ' •» :r ’0 ' 0 -uG
‘
in tj . : LoqlO..
43
dizzily upward: the demand of the Allies for foodstuffs
and cotton, the requirements of our mobilized forces, said
the needs of post-war Europe before its war-torn lands could
be reclaimed* As a producer of foodstuffs and staples,
and a land speculator as well, the farmer grew rich and
contented. American agriculture expanded and opened marginal
and submarginal lands, using irrigation and day farming to
circumvent inadequate rainfall* Consequently, between 1910
and 1920, the acreage increased 9 per cent; land given over
to farming in the mountain states more than doubled; the
area of irrigated land increased by five million acres.
The monetary value of American farms mounted; in some
regions doubling, and in others, trebling their prices.
Before the war, (1910) land in Iowa, for example, was worth
$82 an acre; in 1919, it sold for $200 an acre. Spring
wheat which sold at Chicago for 93 cents a bushel in 1913,
sold for $2.76 in 1919. Corn which sold at Chicago for 70
cents a bushel in 1913, sold for $2.76 in 1919, and com which
sold in New York for 13 cents a pount in 1913, brought 38
cents a pound in 1919.
Lulled by a sense of security, the American farmer
broadened his horizons: he increased his improvements,
bought machinery on a large scale for the first time, invested
in trucks and automobiles, installed a telephone, and elec-
trified his house and barn. He clamored for his state and
county government to extend the social services; namely,
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better roads, consolidated schools, county hospital and
nursing units, old age pensions, local farm bureaus, and
university extension activities. To the accompaniment,
of course, of an ever mounting tax rate.
Deflation Period
The golden age of prosperity was short lived for
the farmer. The era of deflation which set in toward the
end of 1920 left its mark on industry and agriculture alike;
but industry began to recover in 1922, whereas agriculture
remained permanently depressed, for industry, land values
plunged until they were not much higher than they had been
before the war; crop prices dropped until they were lower
in some instances than they had been for half a century;
agriculture was left with a heavy burden of debt and taxation
as a result of overexpansion of acreage, improvements, and
publio budgets. The depression of 1929 merely served to
sharpen the outlines of a situation that had been steadily
growing bleaker as the decade of the twenties progressed.
Stated in simple language, farm prices had been deflated,
while farm costs, necessaries for home and field, mortgage
debt and taxes were still highly inflated. In other words,
the farm account oould not be balanced.
Value of Farm Property Declined
The valuation of farm property had decreased. In
1919 the total value of such property had been $78,000,000,000;
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it dropped to $57,604,000,000 in 1929; and to $44,000,000,000
tty 1932. Likewise, the value of the farm dollar decreased.
In 1919 (with the average for 1909 - 1914 as 100$) the
prices paid by the farmers for commodities stood at 206;
the prices they received at 205, making a ratio of prices
received to prices paid of 99. The farm dollar was therefore
worth 99 cents. By 1929 it was worth only 89 cents.
Decline in Income
The efficiency of American agriculture was being lowered
not only by deolines in gross and relative income, but also
by the more serious fact that fixed charges were consuming
a larger share of the fanner's earnings than before, so that
he was compelled to divert the use of his income from the
improvement of his technique to the payment of taxes and
interest on mortgages. In 1910, tax payments took 3 per
cent of gross income; in 1920, 4 per cent; and in 1930,
6 per cent. Thus, total fixed charges absorbed 6 per cent
of gross farm income in 1910 and 12 per cent in 1930. Farm
mortgage debt in particular had become a millstone about
the neck of the American agricultural producer. In 1910,
the mortgage debt on American f arm land and buildings
constituted 27*3 per cent of the value of properties; in
1920, 29.1 per cent; and in 1930, 39.6 per cent. Inability
to meet mortgage payments and to pay taxes was converting
many farm owners into tenants or croppers; it was forcing
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others off the land altogether, practically compelling them
to enter the industrial reserve army of America’s urban
population*
Farm Tenancy
The decline of agriculture as a paying proposition
is clearly shown by the inability of farm tenants to pull
themselves up by their own bootstraps and to become farm
owners* In the past, tenancy had been of the ladder
variety; that is, sons, grandsons, and sons-in-law started
out as tenants, accumulated savings and in time became owners*
This upward climb now ceased, and more and more tenants
remained permanently in their inferior status and were
doomed to face insecurity and inadequate incomes. YThereas
in 1860, 25*6 per cent of all the farms in the country were being
operated by tenants; in 1930, 42*4 per cent.
The following tabulation is significant as it shows
the ratio of farms operated by tenants according to geo-
graphical sections.
Farms Operated by Tenants
Year Middle Atlantic South Atlantic Mountain
1880 19.2 36.1 7.4
1930 14.7 48.1 24.4
Tenancy was on the increase in the great corn-hog
and wheat raising areas of the North and in the tobacco
and cotton raising areas of the South. In 1930, 73 per
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cent of farms growing cotton were operated by tenants, one
half of whom were share croppers. In 1930, there were
725,000 croppers in cotton, of whom half were white and
half were blacks.
Equally significant as an example of decline was the
debased position of agricultural real estate, that single
factor which heretofore had always succeeded in maintaining
balance.
The following tabulation shows the estimated value of
agricultural real estate per acre for 1914, 1920, and 1929.
Estimated Value of Agricultural Real Estate
1914 1920 1929
103 170 116
East North Central States 103 161 100
West North Central States 103 184 112
East South Central States 103 199 129
West South Central States 104 177 136
Mountain States 100 151 101
Pacific States 106 156 142
Such were the outward signs of a deep seated malady
which was not a passing phase but had all the aspects of
permanence.
Reasons for Rise in Prices
The steady rise in the price level preceding the
World War and the sharp rise that occurred during the war
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caused a general price level rising in both agricultural
and in industrial products. This was partly a result of
the increasing production in the United States of industrial
products, many of which had formerly been imported. For
many of these products, farmers had been paying the European
price, plus costs of transporting the products to the farming
regions of the United States, but they had been receiving
for their more important farm products approximately the
European price minus the costs of getting these products
from American farms to Europe. As industrial production in
the United States increased, relative to farm production,
and as increasingly larger proportions of agricultural pro-
duction were absorbed by our rapidly expanding city popula-
tion, the prices of commodities bought by the farmers gradually
decreased relative to prices of the commodities that farmers
produced.
Decline in Prices
Farm prices in 1920 and 1921 experienced a marked declie
in the general price level, both absolute and relative to
the prices of industrial products. This resulted from at
least two factors. The coincident decline in the general
price level, as usual, found greater reflection in the
prices of farm products which are more sensitive to changes
in the price level than most other prices. In addition
there had been a considerable increase in the production of
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certain farm products, notably, wheat, in response to the
war-time demand, supported by credit inflation. When the
United States ceased making loans to her war-time Allies,
European demand was greatly curtailed. This particularly
affected the prices of farm products, for which the export
market is of great importance. Some recovery in the general
price level followed during the next several years, until in
1925, the ratio of prices received by farmers to prices
paid for commodities bought by them reached practically the
pre-war ratio*- For several years during the post war decade,
some agricultural commodities, including cotton, livestock,
and dairy products were even above pre-war parity. However,
the continued decline in the value of farm real estate which
was still being liquidated following the very high war-
time values, together with the large mortgage indebtedness
which had been incurred by many farmers, caused a continued
demand for special legislation designed to aid the farmers.
No sooner had a fair degree of recovery been exper-
ienced by agriculture following the post war collapse, than
a new and even more tragic situation was encountered.
Beginning in 1929, the price levels in both the United States
and in foreign countries declined rapidly until 1935.
Pauses of Agricultural Crisis
The foremost reason f or the Agricultural Crisis may be
traced to the fact that after the Civil War, we were borrow-
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ing capital from Europe to help convert our capitalism from
a merchant to an industrial base. As a result, we engaged
in an heroic expansion of agriculture to permit payments
on foreign borrowings and for those raw materials which we
ourselves could not produce. In short, American industry
was growing up behind high tariff wails with the assistance
of foreign capital; and American agriculture helped to make
this possible*
Europe Becomes Self Sufficient
By 1920, however, following the World War, the
United States had become a creditor nation. Whereas, other
countries, because they were debtors and burdened with the
staggering costs of the world conflict and because of the
ambitions of their capitalists, were now desperately trying
to obtain foreign credit. How help the process better than
by enlargement of their own agricultural operations? This
was especially true of the newer lands, Canada, Australia,
Latin American countries, and the Far East. In addition,
the European countries had begun to strive for agricultural
self-sufficiency. Each was seeking to build up a domestic
agricultural unit to supply at least its home food requirements.
>
This was to be accomplished by great grants of agricultural
credits, by resettlement projects, by high tariff walls, by
import quota systems, and by milling requirements.
~v. o lo ; ;• < j 0 ... * v- —. * ) -1 X
'
- t
•
.
, .- 0 O' i >J J - •. ..:. U . ' i : . y o.
.< 3 V •.»*.
;
. U icm." ! • j.
*
^ : . V . * 1 J .(9 «r j. . 3' ; 0
... Z ...
’
cf .1' 40': L.'iYf
J ;
. ..-
.
' 0 * '.. 3 - JOj.‘ v U*./ ; . :
o
•aldia o
.. . . .
9 • r 'z 'Oi Xo t • r\o- r
r
1 • id* .i. -xc 2-jy o oi
W
M (•
. Cl 1 lloJOo-'i -IT: .
< x3 . ... 'llO. .w .
<
.
,
‘
. i.. • .
• u' .'
1 ;• . . ... u . . . i. i -> ;7C ' C
t
» V , .jf ..
'. ‘q;0 a.
. j • ; . 7 • . • )0 .': ' ;>*
5 ’j i
r«-
'
•;on
. x. ... •
--
.,1 boo' : z j a I j.-i '... cij ... :r:' .3
I 53
•
•
sc ..
t
.
•
•; .
.
:;i.‘ i <
51
World Production of Farm Goods Increased .
The result of this attempt for agricultural self-
sufficiency was a vast expansion in the production of
agricultural goods throughout the world during the nineteen
twenties. Between 1919 and 1932, the United States in-
creased the area devoted to major food crops from 290,000,000
to 320,000,000 acres, or by more than 10 per cent; in the
same period Europe, Canada, Argentina, and Australia increased
their acreage for the same crops from 631,000,000 to 724,
000,000 acres or more than 16 per cent. The export volume for
1932 - 1933 finally shrank below pre-war levels. In the
face of this shrinkage in foreign demand, acreage of im-
portant crops in the United States had been maintained
at about 10 per cent above pre-war level.
This agricultural situation has been encountered
in England sixty years before. Then the English farmers
had not been able to meet the competition of American grains
and meats, because they were burdened with heavy rents,
labor costs, and capital charges. For the same reasons,
America could not now compete with Argentinian and Australian
beef-growers; Canadian and Polish bacon manufacturers;
Argentinian, Australian, Canadian, Russian, and Manchurian
grain farmers.
Restriction of Immigration
Domestic problems also contributed to the Agricultural
Crisis. Because the growth of our population was stunted
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by immigration restriction, domestic consumption of agricul-
tural goods could not increase. Furthermore, the dietary
habits of Americans were changing. We had shifted from
a reliance on grains and beef to a greater use of pork,
vegetables, fruits, milk and sugar. The significance of
this shift lies in the fact that grains and beef are the
products of extensive cultivation, while pork products,
vegetables, fruits, and milk are products of intensive culti-
vation, requiring less land in use but more capital ex-
penditures. Now extensive cultivation was the method of
production of the typical American farming unit, - the family
farm.
Dietary Changes
Significant, also, is the fact that the consumption
of agricultural products at home was not increasing pro-
portionately because of changing habits of diet and clothing.
,
Improved methods of heating the home; the wide use of heated
automobiles, and the use of machines to eliminate the need
for hard and back-breaking toil all made it possible for
men as well as women to dispense with foods of high caloric
content, since they had been required largely to supply
heat and to replace tissues which were rapidly wearing out.
Efficiency of Agricultural Production
Finally, agriculture itself had become more efficient
therefore, it was possible to produce more foods and fibers
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for each dollar of labor and capital expended. In fact,
between 1919 and 1929, on a stationary cultivated acreage,
the output of American farmers increased more than 20 per
cent. There were notably four main factors responsible for
this revolutionary advance: progress in the application
of mechanical methods and the motorization of farm equip-
ment; increasing acre yields as a result of intensive
cultivation; the improvement of crop strains and the
application of fertilizer; and the greater efficiency of
milk and meat animals per unit of feed consumed.
Decline of Farm Income
During the years between 1919 - 1932 farm income
failed to keep pace with the increase in the national income.
Between 1921 and 1925 farmers shared in the rise in national
income, but that share was less than it had been before the
war. Between 1925 and 1929, the national income advanced
from nearly 82 billion tck over 91 billion dollars, while
total gross income from production remained practically
unchanged, as a result the farmers share of the national
income declined from 18 per cent in 1919 to 9 per cent in
1929, while the share paid to property owners in the form
of interest and dividends increased. The still greater
decline in farm income since 1929 has reduced the farmer’s
share still more.
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The Farmer* s Share in the National Income (1919 - 1932)
Year Estimate of
National Income
Million Dollars
Gross
Farm
Income
Percent of
National
Income
1919 65,949 16,935 18.5
1920 73,999 13,566 14.9
1921 63,371 8,927 11.0
1922 65,925 9,944 11.1
1923 74,337 11,041 10.8
1924 77,135 11,337 10.8
1925 81,931 11,968 11.1
1926 84,238 11,480 9.6
1927 87,276 11,616 9.5
1928 88,283 11,741 9.3
1929 91,405 11,918 9.2
1930 81,295 9,941 7.8
1931 67,000 6,911 7.4
1932 53,500 5,143 7.0
1. Economic Bases for the A. A. A., page 6
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Disparity in Farm Prices
Even at the peak of boom prosperity in 1929, farm
products could be exchanged for only 91 per cent as much of
other products as they could have been exchanged for in the
period before the war. During the depression the disparity
was further increased: by February, 1933, the exchange value
of farm products for industrial goods had fallen to 50 per
cent of the pre-war average. The exchange value for services
such as labor, taxes and credit was even less.
The disparity was present in the price of every farm
product. It was most severe in the case of export commodities,
such as cotton, wheat, tobacco, and rice, because the severe
contraction or disappearance of export demand had built up
excess stocks of the commodities.
However, there has been a disparity between agricultural
and non-agricultural prices since 1920. The disparity had
become much wider since 1929, but narrowed during the
economic recovery that followed the first post-war depression
of 1920 and 1921. During this period, the purchasing power
of farm commodities rose, because industrial conditions
both at home and abroad stimulated the demand for them.
The short grain crops in this country in 1924 and 1925
together with the heavy industrial production had kept
industrial prices from rising. After 1925, agricultural
prices ceased to improve in relation to other prices. After
1929, non-agricultural prices declines also, but far less
sharply. Hence, the unfavorable disparity between farm and
factory goods increased.
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Index Numbers of Farm Prices 1
and Their Relative Purchasing Power
February, 1929, and February, 1933.
product Feb. 1929 Feb. 1933 Decrease
Relative Pur-
chasing Power
February 1933
Wheat 118 37 69 36
Corn 135 30 78 29
Oat s 118 33 72 33
Cotton 145 44 70 44
Cottonseed 176 40 77 40
Hogs 123 41 67 40
Sheep 175 47 73 47
Lamb 214 71 67 70
Cattle 171 64 63 63
Calves 180 70 61 70
Butter 177 72 59 58
Chicken 194 82 58 82
Eggs 148 51 66 81
1 Economic Bases for the Agricultural Adjustment Act,
U. 8. Department of Agriculture, Page 8.
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Index of prices Received and Prices Paid by Farmers.^
prices Received by Farmers (Aug. 1909-July 1914*100$)
Truck Dairy All
Year Grains Fruits Crops Products Groups
1920 232 248 — 198 211
1921 112 201 — 156 125
1922 106 156 — 143 132
1923 113 216 — 159 142
1924 129 212 150 149 143
1925 157 177 153 153 156
1926 131 122 143 152 145
1927 128 128 121 155 139
1928 130 152 159 158 149
1929 120 144 149 157 146
1930 100 102 140 138 126
1931 63 63 117 108 87
1932 44 47 102 83 65
1933 62 64 105 82 70
1 Agricultural Situation, monthly bulletin issued by
Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Washington, D. C.
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Prices paid by Farmers for Commodities Used in^*
Year Living Production
Living and
Production
Ratio
of Prices
received to
prices paid
1920 222 174 201 195
1921 161 141 152 82
1922 156 139 149 89
1923 160 141 152 93
1924 159 143 152 94
1925 164 147 157 99
1926 162 146 155 94
1927 159 145 153 91
1928 160 148 155 96
1929 158 147 153 95
1930 148 140 145 87
1931 126 122 124 70
1932 108 107 107 61
1933 109 108 109 64
1 The Agricultural Situation, Department of Agriculture
Issued Monthly.
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Decline of Consumers Income
During the period from 192S to 1S33, consumers
purchasing power dropped about fifty per cent. Earnings of
industrial workers such as factory and railroad employees
and men engaged in construction and mining fell nearly
seventy per cent. Though unemployment was the chief cause
of the decline, reduced wage rates contributed. This change
in consumer buying power affected agricultural prices more
than non-agricultural prices, because stocks of farm
commodities accumulated, while stocks of non-agricultural
goods, as a rule, did not. Farms continued to produce,
whereas factories closed down. A depression causes a
surplus of goods in agriculture, but a surplus of labor
in industry. More time is required in which to readjust
farm production than factory production, therefore, a
price disparity against agriculture is a natural consequence.
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Index Numbers
Year
Representing Changes in
or purchasing Power.
National Income^
Consumers Income,
Income of
Industrial Workers
1920 99.97 115
1921 84.05 80
1922 87.83 83
1923 100.00 101
1924 103.81 94
1925 110.79 98
1926 113.65 103
1927 115.25 100
1928 117.20 100
1929 120.85 105
1930 110.82 87
1931 92.18 66
1932 72.63 45
1933 69.80 46
The Agricultural Situation, February, 1935, Page 5.
2 Economic Bases for the A. A. A.
,
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After a decline in 1920, the price level of farm
prices remained relatively stable until 1929. In 1920 farm
prices reached 213 per cent, and in 1921 dropped to 125 per
cent, recovering gradually to 149 per cent.
During this period from 1929 to 1933 inclusive,
cotton prices declined from 78 per cent below the parity
level to 38 per cent below in the summer of 1933. Cotton-
seed, in 1932, was only 46 per cent of the pre-war average.
Wheat fell to 30 per cent of pre-war prices. Corn dropped
from a level of 90 cents per bushel in 1930, to 19 cents in
December 1932. The price of hay per ton was about 40 per
cent less in 1932, than in 1929. In December 1932, hogs
reached the lowest level in more than 50 years. Tobacco
fell from 80 per cent of pre-war level to 60 per cent in
1931, but due to reduced crops in 1932, average about
20 per cent below the standard price of $2.47.
Government Attempts to Aid Farmer
During the nineteen twenties, the government attempted
to aid the farmer, but the programs presented failed to solve
the fundamental problems such as high costs, heavy fixed
charges, economic and social maladjustments resulting from
tenancy, and contraction of the market for agricultural
goods, in the late twenties, a powerful political agrarian
interest sought the passage of fundamental agricultural
legislation. However, both president Coolidge and President
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Hoover opposed.
packers and Stock Yards Act
In 1921 the Government passed the packere and Stock
yards Act. This measure was formulated to aid the cattle
raisers and declared it unlawful for the packers to engage
in unfair practices, to combine in order to control prices
and apportion markets, or to create a monopoly. It required
those engaged in the operation of stock yards, or market
agencies to register with the Secretary of Agriculture and
to file with him a statement of their charges. These
charges were to be reasonable and non-discriminatory
. The
administration of this law was to be vested in the Secretary
of Agriculture, who was to operate much as the Trade Com-
mission operated in the case of unfair business practices;
namely, to register complaints, to hold hearings, and to
issue orders to "cease and desist."
Federal Intermediate Credit Act .
In 1923 the Federal Intermediate Credit Act was
drawn up and was intended to make easier the extension of
credits to farmers by setting up a system of federal inter-
mediate credit banks for the purpose of handling agricultural
paper exclusively. This act authorized the Federal Farm
Loan Board to grant charters to twelve new institutions which
were to be known as the Federal Intermediate Credit Banks.
These were to be established in the same cities as the
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Federal Land Banks and were to have the same officers.
They were to be separate corporations, however. Each bank
was to have a capital stock of $5,000,000, (with the
government as the only subscriber) and each bank could
issue debentures up to ten times its paid-up capital and
surplus. The security for these debentures was to be
agricultural paper, which the banks were to re-discount.
This rediscounted paper was to come from state and
national banks, trust companies, agricultural credit
corporations and the like. It was to consist entirely
of notes, drafts, and bills of exchange whose proceeds had
been used for agricultural purchases, or for livestock. The
intermediate credit banks could also lend directly to
agricultural cooperatives on notes secured by warehouse
receipts and bills of lading, for a period ranging from
six months to three years, and up to 75 per cent of the
market value of the products that were pledged as collateral.
Equalization Fee and Export Debenture Plans
Later in the decade, there were two outstanding
proposals advanced by the farmers interests for agricultural
relief; namely, the equalization fee and export debenture plan.
These measures proposed to raise the level of domestic prices
on agricultural products up to the point where full advantage
of the tariff duties on agricultural commodities could be
obtained. This was to be achieved by segregating the
domestic requirement from the exportable surplus at the
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going world price. Under the equalization fee plan, the
difference between the artificial domestic price and the normal
world price (on the surplus) was to be borne by the farmer who
raised each commodity. Underthe export debenture plan, ohis
difference was to be borne by the government, out of customs
receipts. Thus while price fixing was to be countenance in both
instances, in the export debenture plan, the growers of staples
which entered the world market were to be subsidized.
In April 1928, the equalisation fee bill passed both
in Congress and the Senate but was rejected by President
Coolidge.
1
The bill contained the following provisions:
(1) It provided for a federal farm board which was authorized
to loan money to cooperative associations, for the purpose
of assisting them to control seasonable surpluses in excess
of domestic needs. (2) It provided for collection of an
equalization fee from the grower of each staple, sufficient
to cover the losses sustained inmarketing the surplus. These
losses were due to the disparity between the domestic price
and the world price. (3) It established a revolving fund
of $400,000,000 to finance these operations.
The export debenture plan was first introduced in
Congress January 1926, reintroduced in 1928, and in 1929
added by insurgent Republican Senators to both t he Smoot
tariff bill and the administrations agricultural marketing
bill. But in both cases, the House demanded that the debenture
pbe abandoned and the Senate was compelled to acceed. ' The
1 Bconomics with Applications to Agriculture, Dummeier and
Hefleoower, p. 672.
2 Ibid, p. 673.
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proposal contained the following essentials: (1) export
bounties were to be paid on wheat, corn, rice, cotton,
tobacco, swine, and cattle. (2) The rates specified in
the 1928 bill were to be one-half of the tariff duties,
that is to say governmental revenues were to be reduced
by the amount of export debentures or bounties issued for
a particular year. (3) A federal farm board was to be
established, its chief function, to regulate domestic pro-
duction of agricultural staples by reducing, or even can-
celling, the debenture rates. (4) The bounty was to be
cut if production by the farmers was increased: if the
increase in production exceeded 15 per cent above the
average for the preceding five years, the debenture was
to be revoked.
Agricultural Marketing Act
President Hoover* 8 program for agricultural relief
was embodied in the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929. The
Seventy-first Congress was called in special session to cope
with the farm and tariff problems. As a result of this
session, the Agricultural Marketing Act was passed. This
act was founded on the principle of voluntary cooperation
under government auspices; that is, agriculture was to be
redeemed through the operation of nationwide cooperative
marketing associations, as well as through the exercise of
self discipline. With its millions of small units, agricul-
ture was to work as corporate industry functioned: namely,
to curtail production and thus establish equilibrium between
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domestic supply and demand; to shift quickly from one form
of activity to another as demands changed; to rationalize
its plant, and to seek a greater return from wages of manage-
ment than from capital investments.
Federal Farm Board
The new act embodied the following provisions:
(1) A Federal Farm Board was to be established consisting
of eight members to be appointed by the President, with the
consent of the Senate for a term of six years. (2) This
Board should encourage the organization and development
of agricultural cooperatives. (3) A revolving fund of
$500,000,000 was created, from which loans were to be made
to cooperatives. (4) The Board might institute advisory
committees for particular agricultural commodities, and
upon application might recognize stabilization corporations.
These corporations would be enabled to control, handle
and market the surpluses of their particular commodities,
through loans from the revolving fund. (5) The Board
might enter into agreements which would insure the
cooperatives against loss because of decline in prices.
The Board functioned for three years and success-
fully stimulated cooperative marketing associations. Through
its efforts, cooperatives were organized for marketing
almost every species of crop produced in the country. In
its first year alone, the Board received applications for
loans from 206 cooperatives, of which 132 were approved to
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the amount of $165,146,555.
A more important injunction even than that of encour-
aging self-held was imposed upon the Board, that of^ "aiding
in preventing and controlling surpluses in any agricultural
commodity through orderly production and distribution,
so as to maintain advantageous domestic markets and prevent
such surpluses from causing undue and excessive fluctuations
or depressions in prices for the commodity."
In the fall of 1929, an impending crisis in wheat
and in cotton compelled the Board to act. Proceeding on
the assumption that the wheat crop of 1929 was a short
one, and therefore, the market price was too low, the
Board offered to lend wheat cooperatives $1.18 per bushel
for all wheat held off the market.
Grain Stabilization Corporation
In February, 1930, the Board created the first of
its two stabilization agencies, the Grain Stabilization
Corporation. This organization entered the wheat market
twice and in all, bought some 330,000,000 bushels, the
first operation being completed in the middle of 1930 and
the second in the middle of 1931. Three results were
apparent from these ventures by the Federal Farm Board's
subsidiary. (1) Its purchases succeeded in pegging the
1 Economic Problems
,
Fairchild and Compton, p. 84.
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domestic price from 20 to 30 cents above the world figure
for about six months. (2) However, as soon as the Grain
Stabilization Corporation abandoned the market permanently
in June 1931, the price of July wheat dropped to 57 cents,
the lowest for this commodity since 1896. (3) The federal
government was left in possession of the whole 1930-1931
carry-over, and this naturally menaced the new crop.
What could be done with the wheat surpluses?
Nothing, apparently, but to hold them. With the exception
of some 47,000,000 bushels which it was able to sell abroad
between July and November 1931, the Federal Farm Board
was left with the residue on its hands, to be disposed of
in small lots; meanwhile, the storage charges mounted
higher and higher to finally wipe out the value of the
original investment.
The same procedure was repeated with cotton. The
Federal Farm Board lent an average price of 16 cents a
pound to cotton cooperatives for cotton held off the market.
As cotton prices still continued to drop, there was urgent
need for some stabilizing agency. Therefore, the Cotton
Stabilization Corporation was formed in June 1930, went
into the market, and in its efforts to sustain the price was
compelled to buy the entire carry-over of 1929-1930, a total
of 1,319,800 bales. The second transaction, the purchase
of the 1930-1931 carry-over left the Corporation with a
total supply of 3,250,000 bales in warehouses, and as a
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result, cotton sold at 5 cents a pound in 1932. After its
affairs were straightened out the Federal Farm Board found
it had lost $150,000,000 in cotton alone.
Acreage Reduction
As early as the summer of 1930, the Federal Farm
Board began an intensive campaign to urge the farmers to
reduce acreage, perhaps because it had little confidence
in its own program, or rather, that it might have two
strings to its bow. Members of the Board publicly stated
that the American farmer was overproducing; that he ought
to cut his acrease to the requirements of the domestic
market; that his surpluses entered a world market, where
they were compelled to compete with products raised by
cheap labor, on cheap land and transported by water. But
the American grower of staples, either could not, or would
not reduce acreage; the crops for 1931-1932 were as bountiful
as ever. The irony of the siutation was that although the
Federal Farm Board exhorted and conjoled in an effort
to obtain acreage reduction, at the same time, the Department
of Agriculture and the states, through their experiment
stations and educational agencies, happily continued to teacn
farmers how to grow bigger and better crops.
Valorization
There are lessons to be learned from the various
measures taken to relieve the farmer and to increase his
.
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prices. Witnout complete control over production the
possibilities that a longterm control would be even partially
successful are remote. In the absence of such control or
restrictions, the valorization (which is an attempt to con-
trol the marketing of a commodity by preventing a temporary
excess of supply from unduly depressing prices below their
normal long time level, and then in time, using the supply
accumulated to offset a "temporary scarcity" of new supply
which might cause an excessive price rise) must depend
upon accidental reductions in crops due to adverse weather
conditions, in order to accomplish the necessary decrease
in supply.
Another development which attends the adoption
of valorization schemes and which hinders its successful
operation is the creation of a condition of uncertainty,
created by holding stocks off the market either by the
government or by the producers. This tends to have a
depressing effect on prices. Other sellers who are un-
certain with regard to when these stocks may be unloaded
with consequent further depression in price, frequently
dump their holdings. Buyers, on the other hand, realize
that the accumulating stocks are being withheld, and that
sooner or later, they will have to be sold, therefore, they
adopt "hand to mouth" buying policies.
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Section IV
Agricultural Adjustment Administration, 1933-1939
Agriculture Adjustment Act
Tne passage of these various acts already mentioned
did not relieve the farmers' plight. Prices of nearly all
products had been flinging downward for nearly four years;
farm prices had reached levels lower than had ever been
recorded in modern times. Conditions had become acute:
thus, the Agricultural Adjustment Act was called into being
and passed in iiay 1933. The act contains the following
declarations of emergency and policy, together with specific
reasons why the act was passed:^- "That the present acute
economic emergency, being in part, the consequence of a
severe and increasing disparity between the prices of
agricultural and other commodities, which disparity has
largely destroyed the purchasing power of farmers for
industrial products, has broken down the orderly exchange
of commodities, and has seriously impaired the Agricultural
assets supporting the national credit structure, - it is
hereby declared that these conditions in the basic industry
of agriculture have affected transactions in agricultural
commodities and obstructed the normal currents of commerce in
such commodities, and render imperative the immediate
enactment of title I of the act."
1 Economic Bases, from the Agricultural Adjustment Act,
Page 1.
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This act was passed ostensibly as an emergency
measure, but it is evident, however, that its chief
framers and administrators intended that its production
control and "land use" powers be permanent policy.
Purpose of the Act
In assuming office as Agricultural Administrator,
George Peck said,^ "In the first place, the sole aim and
object of this act is to raise farm prices. Generally
speaking, it is to raise them to a point where farm products
will purchase as much of industrial products as they did
before the war, and to keep farm prices at that level."
It was obviously necessary to mollify consumers who were
going to pay these higher prices, so the plea was put on
moral grounds, and on grounds of general economic advantage.
Mr. Peck continued
,
2
"To the consuming public, it is unneces-
sary to say that what is to be done is to bring about economic
justice, to right a social wrong which grew up under our
economic system in the false theory that the urban half of
our population could enjoy the benefits of an artificial
protective system, leaving the rural half largely outside
the benefits of that device. Lately, it has resulted in
talcing the farmer's crop away from him without paying
for it. Nobody wants to do that. Agriculture must be
Practical problems of Economics, page 295.
2 Mitchell and L. Mitchell, Practical Problems in Economy,
P. 85.
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restored to its proper place in the nation's life, not
only for the sake of the farmer, hut also for the general
welfare .
"
The Agricultural Adjustment Act was a means of
raising farm prices through Government aid and control. 1
The immediate object of this price rise was to "re-establish
prices to farmers at a level that will give agricultural
commodities a purchasing power with respect to articles
that farmers buy, equivalent to the purchasing power of
agricultural commodities in the base period." The term,
"parity price," came into being with the passage of this
act. It is calculated by multiplying the average price of
the commodity for the base period, (usually 1910-1914) by
the index of prices paid by farmers (including interest
and taxes) for the year (or month) for which the parity
price is being calculated and dividing the result by 100.
Thus, if the average price of cattle is $11.00 per hundred
weight and the index of prices paid by farmers in 1934
was 120, the parity price of cattle for 1934 would be
$11 x 120 100 - $13.20.
The goal of parity prices was to be achieved by a
combination of methods including voluntary production control,
marketing agreements, surplus removal operations, benefit
payments and licensing of processors. Not all of these
1 Economic Bases for the A. A. A.
,
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provisions were of equal importance in the actual operation
of the act: subsequent events indicated that reliance was
mainly placed upon production limitation in return for the
receipt of benefit payments. These controls and benefit
payments, however, were restricted to certain designated basic
commodities; wheat, cotton, rice, tobacco, field corn, hogs,
and milk. A little less than a year later, when the Jones
Connally Act was enacted, six additional commodities were added:
rye, flax, barley, grain sorghums, cattle and peanuts. Sub-
sequently, sugar was added under the Jones-Costigan Act of
May 9, 1934, and potatoes under the Warren Potato Act of 1935.
Thus, the total was increased to fifteen. The powers of the
American Agricultural Act was not strictly limited to these
fifteen basic agricultural commodities, however, since market-
ing agreements could be entered into for any agricultural
commodity or product.
Bankhead and Kerr-Smith Controls
The broad powers given to the Agricultural Adjustment
Act were further supplemented by additional legislation concern-
ing four basic commodities. As has already been noted, sugar
and potatoes were made basic commodities as a result of
legislation in 1934 and 1935, in both cases the technique of
control was provided in the statute. A more rigid control
was set up in the Bankhead Cotton Control Act and the Kerr-
Smith Tobacco Control for these two commodities. At the
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President's request, both acts were repealed by Congress,
after the Supreme Court had declared the Agricultural.
Adjustment Act unconstitutional*
Fixed Prices Established
Under the Agricultural Adjustment Act, a fixed price
was established through four channels: production control,
marketing agreements, commodity loan programs, and surplus
removal operations. These programs attempted to raise farm
prices to a fixed parity with non-farm prices. These methods
of control by power given to the Secretary of Agriculture
will now be considered.
Since large surpluses represented a fundamental factor
in the Agricultural picture, in the spring of 1933, it was
thought feasible to control the production of certain basic
agricultural commodities, namely, wheat, cotton, corn, hogs,
rice, tobacco, and milk. Tftese controls were to be achieved
by agreements with producers, or by other voluntary methods.
Although production control activities w ere permissible
in the case of fifteen basic commodities, they were of little
or no value for seven of these: flax, barley, grain sorghums,
cattle, milk, rye, and potatoes. Programs were formulated for
rye and potatoes late in 1935, but before much progress had
been made the act was declared unconstitutional and they had
to be abandoned. In the instance of the other five products,
no acceptable programs matured. Thus, production control was
effected only in eight of the basic commodities.
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Cotton required the largest curtailment of output in
1934, and cooperating producers reduced their acreage more
than one third below that of the base period: smaller re-
ductions were necessary for wheat (15 per cent), corn (20
per cent), and hogs (25 per cent). This percentage reduction
was changed for 1935, as surplus stocks were reduced.
Producers could hardly be expected to reduce their
acreage from purely altruistic motives, or because they
realized the price depressing effects of large surpluses. The
incentive to such reduction was furnished by the cash payments
contributed by the government, these payments to be based upon
the number of acres witheld from production. In the case of
each commodity, it became the task of the individual producer
to determine which course of action would prove most advan-
tageous to him.
Although participation in each program was supposedly
voluntary, the passage of the Bankhead Cotton Control Act
and the Kerr-Smith Tobacco Control Act, with their provisions
for the imposition of prohibitive taxes on all production
sold in excess of alloted quotas, made the controls for these
two commodities virtually compulsory. Thus, output of cotton
and tobacco with profit was a hard situation to explain after
the passage of these two acts.
Production Limited by Controls
The effectiveness of these controls in limiting pro-
duction for the purpose of raising prices may be shown by
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the following: the major causes of the reduction in output
and in surplus stocks of corn, hogs, and wheat were the
severe drought in 1934 and the adverse weather conditions
which prevailed during the remainder of the period. For
example, the wheat crop averaged 567,000,000 bushels per
year for the period 1933 to 1935, as compared with864.000.
000 bushels annually during 1928 to 1932. Accord-
ing to the estimates of the Brookings Institutions, only
about six per cent of this 300,000,000 bushel reduction was
due to the Agricultural Adjustment Act; the balance may be
attributed to adverse w eather conditions. Similarly, the
A. A* A. was responsible for only about ten per cent of the
900.000.
000 bushel reduction of corn in 1934; the weather
proved to be the limiting factor for hogs, as well.
Marketing Agreements
To control agricultural commodities not designated
as basic, the Secretary of Agriculture was given the power,
^
"to enter into marketing agreements with processors, asso-
ciations of producers and others engaged in handling an agri-
cultural commodity in interstate or foreign commerce." The
A. A. A. has described a marketing agreement as a formal
written compact entered into and signed by parties who are
bound by its provisions. The underlying principle aims to make
the marketing process more orderly. The administrative body
1 Agricultural Adjustment Act Section 8 Part 2 .
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of an agreement subtracts the salable supply from the avail-
able supply and thus ascertains the surplus supply; it then
endeavors to move the salable supply in some socially
beneficial way outside the regular marketing channel. The
techniques to make the regularization of supply effective
were not stipulated in the Act, and hence varied in the different
agreements. Among those more frequently used were: (l) restric-
tions on shipments of inferior grades or sizes; (2) restrictions
on supplies sent to specified auction markets; (3) period to
period proration (limiting the amount that could be sold in
a given period) and (4) limitation of the total supply whose
shipment or sale will be permitted during the whole market-
ing season. M Since the license included all persons engaged
in processing, distributing or handling the commodity, it
furnished an effective means of bringing recalcitrant minorities
under control, - whether they signed the agreement or not.
Marketing agreements were adopted for several basic commod-
ities as well as for general crops. Milk was the outstanding
example of the application of a marketing agreement to a
basic product; the major problem in this case was viewed as
the regularization of supply, rather than production control.
In 1934, the tobacco marketing agreement was superseded by
an adjustment program, while that for the rice industry was
not abandoned until 1935. The rice marketing agreements
under which t he industry operated in 1934, however, included
provisions permitting producers to control the acreage planted.
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These agreements also,
1
“provided for minimum prices to
producers and for minimum conversion charges to millers
for the sale of clean rice." Peanuts were also subject to
a marketing agreement which had been entered into before it
became a basic commodity. Under this agreement and the
accompanying license, minimum prices were established for
farmers stock peanuts. However, the agreement was terminated
immediately after the adoption of an adjustment program in
September 1934.
Price Fixing „
The objective of the marketing agreements, like that
of production control, was the attainment of parity prices.
Unlike the adjustment programs, however, there was no hesi-
tation about supplementing marketing agreements with the fix-
ing of minimum prices: it was under these marketing agreements,
that practically all price fixing which attended the A. A. A.
p
took place. Prices of milk “to producers were set as
minimum prices, below which no milk could be purchased and
complete detailed schedules of resale prices, both wholesale
and retail, appeared in the agreements up to the time of the
change in policy.” Again, in the operation of the northwest
3
fruit tree agreement, “primary emphasis has been placed upon
the control of the supply offered for sale on the various
auction markets. “ For English walnuts, 4 “the agreement pro-
1 Agricultural Adjustment 1933 to 1935 page 238.
2 Agricultural Adjustment 1933 to 1935 page 163.
3 Agricultural Adjustment 1933 to 1935 page 184.
4 Agricultural Adjustment 1933 to 1935 page 181.
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vides for both maximum and minimum packers sales priares,”
although minimum prices were not paid to producers.
Price fixing, as evidenced by the above mentioned cases,
played some part in the marketing controls for minor agri-
cultural products.
Commodity Loan
Another measure used was known as the Commodity Loan.
This loan was an attempt on t he part of the government to
raise the price the farmer received for his product. The
loans were made possible by the organization of the Commodity
Credit Corporation in 1933. Immediately it was announced
that loans would be made on cotton at ten cents a pound and on
corn at 45 cents a bushel. The loans were made "without
recourse.” If the market value of the commodity declined
below its loan value and had to be sold, the government
suffered the loss incurred. If, on the other hand, the
market price advanced above the loan value, the farmer pro-
fited by selling the commodity at the higher price, and
repaying his loan. In effect, this scheme permitted the
farmer to sell his cotton or corn to the government, at
a price equivalent to the loan value, and to receive, in
addition, any profits which might have accrued from sales
above that value; at the same time, avoiding the losses if
the ultimate sales price fell below. To determine whether
or not these loans were effective, the A* A. A. pointed out
that they, 1 “contributed support to farm prices by enabling
1 Agricultural Adjustment 1933 - 1935. Page 75.
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producers to retain title to products which might otherwise
have been dumped upon the market with price-depressing effect.
They have made it possible for producers themselves to gain
the advantage of price increases which would otherwise have
been lost to them through enforced marketing and they have
certainly contributed to more orderly marketing. 11
Loans for both corn and cotton were made at varying
rates from 1933 to 1935. When the com loan of 45 cents per
bushel was promulgated in 1933, farm prices in most areas
were below that level; one effect of this program was, there-
fore, the raising of prices to the loan level. In 1934, the
drought, with the accompanying sharp rise in corn prices,
naturally made it more profitable for farmers to pay off
their loans then to default on them; hence these loans
were paid in full. For the 1934 to 1935 crop year, loans
were made at 55 cents per bushel, while in the following
year the loan basis was reduced to 45 cents.
Of the two lending programs adopted, corn was re-
latively more successful than cotton. It should be kept in mind,
however, that the drought was the paramount factor in the
success of corn, rather than any inherent virtue of the
loan program. Had Nature been more bountiful in 1934, it
is probable that the corn loans might have encountered
difficulties similar to those which befell the cotton pro-
gram. At the beginning of the year 1933, the cotton farmer
was in a precarious position as far as prices were concerned.
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He was getting 5.8 cents per pound for his cotton as against
18 cents per pound in 1929. Therefore, new restrictions were
imposed as a means of eliminating the difficulties arising
from the policy of the Federal Farm Board.
The control of cotton was an example of governmental
interference in the law of supply and demand for the purpose
of raising prices. The A. A. A. provided for rental or
benefit payments to the farmers in exchange for a voluntary
curtailment in acreage. The funds were to be obtained by
the levy of a processing tax,^ “upon the first domestic pro-
cessing of the commodity, whether of domestic production or
imported." Although the tax was paid in the beginning by
the processor, it could be passed on to the consumer. Thus,
the farmer's gain in the form of benefit payments, was
derived from the processor, the manufacturer, or the ultimate
consumer.
If the processed cotton were exported, the tax was
refunded to the exporter. Provision was also made for levy-
ing of a compensatory tax on competing products, so that the
domestic consumption would not be reduced, due to a shift to
substitute products which were relatively lower in price.
Under this provision, a compensatory tax was levied on jute
fabrics and certain paper products.
1 Agricultural Adjustment 1933 and 1934 p. 38
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Compulsory Reduction of Cotton Acreage
Although acreage was reduced approximately 35 per cent
as a result of the “plow up” campaign during the first year
of the control, the total crop remained almost unchanged, that
is, at slightly more than }.3,000,000 hales. The failure to
reduce the supply of new cotton resulted in a large increase
in production by those farmers who refused to conform to the
Bankhead Cotton Control Act. This bill changed the cotton
control program from voluntary to compulsory compliance.
Under the new act, the amount of cotton that a farmer could
raise was limited by the imposition of a prohibitive tax of
50 per cent in ginning, in excess of the allotted quota.
Those who refused to participate in the program received no
allotments, and as a result, had to pay a tax of 50 per cent
on all cotton sold by them.
The control over acreage and production was only one
phase of the program to help the cotton farmer: the second
phase was concerned with making loans. The first loan pro-
gram (up to 10 cents per pound, depending upon tie grade)
was adopted in the fall of 1933 in response to heavy pres-
sure from the South. The following year a 12 per cent loan
program was instituted despite the relatively improved
situation of cotton farmers. In both cases, the loans were
made at rates which were roughly equivalent to prevailing
market prices and tended to establish minimum prices, at
those levels.
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Results of Loans
One of the primary objectives of the cotton program
was to increase the price of cotton by drastic reduction
of production. Cash income received by cotton producers
exceeded $800,000,000 in each crop year from 1933 to 1935,
as compared with less than $500,000,000 in the 1932 crop
year.
Cash income from cotton production and adjustment payments.'1'
Year Cash Income from Cotton prod. and adj. payment
1933 464,000,000
1933 862,000,000
1934 822,000,000
1935 877,000,000
Year Price of cotton lint per pound
1932 6.5
1933 10.2
1934 12.4
1935 11.1
1932
Total Production
Bales
13,001,000
1933 13,047,000
1934 9,636,000
1935 10,638,000
1 Agricultural Adjustment 1933 - 1935 P. 119.
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The program was also moderately successful in reducing
the available supply of American cotton. Figures taken
from the report of the A. A. A. show that the Bankhead Act
could restrict production, but not other factors, such as
loss of work by the ginners, truckmen and warehousemen,
which were caused by the restriction. Likewise an increase
in the number of dispossessed tenants and sharecroppers did
not materially help to improve the unemployment situation.
Furthermore, the A. A* A. combined with the N. R. A., tended
to increase the domestic price of cotton with the result
that domestic consumption declined. A loss of world markets,
augmented by a decline in domestic consumption could hardly
help but bring ruin to many of the textile mills in New
England and the South.
Surplus Removal Operations
A less important project employed by the A. A. A. in
attempting to attain parity was the surplus removal operations.
This was a plan whereby burdensome surpluses were destroyed,
for example, the purchase and destruction of light weight pigs
and sows reduced the price depressing surpluses and enabled
a substantial price rise to take effect. Price of hogs per
hundred weight rose from $3.47 in 1932 to $8.50 in 1935. Cotton
planters were likewise encouraged to plow up land by being
offered inducements in the form of benefit payments. As a
result, the cotton crop of 1933 was reduced by about one fourth,
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or specifically, by 4,400,000 bales; at the same time
10,000,000 acres of land were actually "taken out of cotton."
The favorable effect of this "plow up" upon cotton stocks
maybe readily appreciated by noting that the carry-over
was reduced by less than one million bales.
Surplus removal and drought relief expenditures by
commodities and by calendar years through Dec. 31, 1935.
Total
Commodity 1933 1934 1935 All years
Hogs emergency $30,643,102 30,643,102
Hogs supplementary 12,186,100 12,186,100
Pork products,
supplement ary 2,793,967 2,793,967
Butter , surplus removal 9,418,379 5,214,338 1,792,342 16,425,059
Cheese, surplus removal 1,417,534 1,648,344 3,065,878
Milk:
Evaporated 2,223,487 2,223,487
Dry skim 912,008 912,008
Sugar, surplus removal 365,536
Cattle, drough relief 102,744,455 8,801,549 111,546,104
Sheep, drought relief 6,764,548 454,760 7,219,308
Goats, drought relief 371,762 118,882 490,444
Feed, drought relief 88,489 88,489
Seed, drought relief 15,936,916 905,044 16,841,960
Totals §40,061,481 147,795,15616,945,005 204,801,642
1 Agricultural Adjustment 1933 - 35, p. 64.
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Effects of Surplus Removal Operations on Prices, production
and income from com and hogs 1929 - 35.^
Hogs
Weighted
Average Parity Cash Farm Income
Year Farm Price Price Thousand dollars
1924-28 $ 9.61 $ 11.96 1,246,697
1929 9.33 11.84 1,286,345
1932 3.44 8.59 439,536
1933 3.94 8.52 509,418
1934 4.17 9.17 697,619
1935 8.36 9.24 710,000
Corn
Year
Freighted
Average
Farm Price
Parity
Cents per bu.
Total
Production
1,000 bushels
1924-28 84. 106.3 2,623,574
1929 86.5 105.3 2,535,546
1932 28.1 76.4 2,906,873
1933 38. 65.8 2,351,658
1934 64.5 81.5 1,377,126
1935 57.7 82.2 2,202,852
Similar removal operations were also conducted in connection
with butter, cheese, evaportaed milk, dry skim milk, sugar
sheep, goats, feed, and seed.
1 Agricultural Adjustment 1933 - 35, p. 177.
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Federal Surplus Relief Corporation
An interesting aspect of these programs was the
utilization of the acquired surpluses to feed persons
on relief. Although the primary object was to prevent a
temporary surplus from sharply depressing the price, such
stabilization operations only served to make available,
larger amounts of food stuffs for the needy. This meant
an increased demand (financed by government money) which
obviated the necessity of selling the accumulated stocks
at some future time. These operations were handled through
the Federal Surplus Relief Corporation from August 1933 to
November 1935, when its functions were taken over by the newly
organized Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation,
Commodities which were purchased primarily for relief
purposes were acquired, wherever possible, in the local mar-
kets suffering from a temporary glut. Thus, not only wa.s
the depressing influence lessened, but also, some degree of
stabilization was achieved as an incidental aspect of the
Governments efforts to meet the needs of those on relief*
While distributing the surplus to the needy has been
the most important method of surplus disposal, some reduction
was also achieved by diverting farm products to new uses*
This diversion may be accomplished by two methods: either
through subsidizing the use of the product which might prove
less remunerative, or by developing a new use for the pro-
duct* Obviously, the demand for the product has a broader
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base and. the position of its producers is improved in pro-
portion to ftie extent to which new uses are developed. The
experimental project for the use of cotton in road building
which was started by the department of Agriculture early
in 1936, is a splendid example of the successful use of a
product along new lines.
A. A. A« Declared Unconstitutional
On January 6, 1936, by a vote of six to three, the
Supreme Court found the A« A. A. unconstitutional on the
following grounds: (l) the act was a statutory plan for
the control of the volume of agricultural production, - a.
power not granted to the Federal government by the Consti-
tution; therefore, Congress, in taking such action had
invaded the field of regulation reserved to the states
under the Tenth Amendment. (2) The processing taxes and
benefit payments were inseparable parts of the same plan;
therefore, the processing tax was not a proper exercise of
the use of the federal taxing power.
Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act
To circumvent the constitit ional barriers, Congress
quickly passed the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment
Act and the President signed it on February 29, 1936.
Growers of staples (wheat, corn, cotton, and tobacco) were
to receive grants from the government for the purpose of
cultivation. In this instance, however, the farmers were
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not to be under contract, but they were to wbrk under the
supervision of state and county committees. In order to
comply with the ruling of the Supreme Court, the act pro-
vided that after January 1, 1938, the states themselves
were to assume full charge of both the soil building and
soil conservation programs. Grants in aid would be voted
to the states for distribution among cooperating farmers.
Contracts need not be signed, as the farmers were simply
recuired to plan their operations in line with definite
soil cooperation standards set up by producers, soil special-
ists, and state agricultural leaders. Grants were obtained
only after officials had checked the performance with the
standards.
Soil conservation and good farm management were im-
portant objectives under the A. A. A. programs. As experience
showed the need, the A. A. A. modified its original require-
ments, so that contracting farmers might be given more scope
in combining their various crop enterprises in harmony with
the national crop adjustment programs and more incentive
to protect and restore soil values.
Farmers cooperating in the soil conservation program
were qualified for either, or both, of two classes of pay-
ments: class one, the soil conserving payment, and class two,
the soil building payment. Class one payment was available
to farmers who diverted a portion of their soil depleting
base acreage to soil conserving crops or uses. Farmers
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were eligible to receive this payment on any number of
acres up to 15 per cent of their general soil depleting
bases, 35 per cent of their cotton bases, 30 per cent of
their tobacco bases and 20 per cent of their peanut bases.
This payment was determined on a per acre basis, and
averaged approximately $10.00 an acre for the entire country,
varying quite widely of course with the productivity of
different counties and of different farms. Farmers desiring
to qualify for class two payment had to adopt certain approved
practises calculated to restore soil fertility. These
practises varied in different parts of the country but
generally included new seedings of legumes and perennial
grasses, seeding of soy beans, cowpeas, etc., for green
manure and applications of limestone. There was a top limit
on the total amount of class payments that a cooperating
farmer might receive, which was generally the same number of
dollars as there were acres of soil conserving crops on
cropland on his farm in 1936. Hence, the larger the acreage
of soil conserving crops on the farm in 1936, the larger
the soil building allowance. A farmer could earn all or part
of the allowance in proportion to the extent to which he
applied the recommended practises.
As already indicated, the primary aim of the new
program was the conservation and improvement of the soil,
with crop control an incidental by-product.
The shift from soil depleting crops, such as cotton,
tobacco and wheat, to soil conserving crops including
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primarily hay and forage, may be accompanied by an increase
in the animal enterprises. An increase in the relative
output of these two enterprises, especially dairying, appeared
desirable from the national point of view. But it should be
recognized, that farmers in the major dairy areas have for
years followed farm practises and cropping systems of a
soil conserving and soil building character. This problem
has been attacked by continued efforts to secure orderly
and stabilized fluid milk markets through marketing agree-
ments and orders, through the purchase of price depressing
temporary surpluses and their distribution through relief
channels.
Another subsidy effected by this act authorized the
use of public credit to enable competent tenants to purchase
and operate their own farms; to make grants to farmers who
otherwise would be forced to accept relief; and for rural
electrification.
Crop Insurance
Still another important subsidy to the act was
offered the farmer during this period, namely, insurance on
crops. Luck and diance are important factors in a farmer*
s
life. Each crop planted is a speculative venture. Un-
favorable weather conditions, floods, insects, or disease
may cause a partial or a complete failure of his crop.
Increase in prices in years of low production enhance the
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income of farmers who have a good crop but are of very-
little benefit to those whose crop fails. Crop insurance
was an attempt to solve the problem of short crops. But bumper
crops have not been an unmitigated blessing to the farmer, for
frequently a large crop may sell for less than a medium or a
small one. In years of surplus a part of the crop would be
drawn off the market and put into storage: in years of crop
failures these stored commodities would be released, the amount
being automatically determined by the amount of indemnities neces-
sary as defined by the insurance contracts. During surplus
years the removal of the excess commodities from the market
would tend to support the price. That part of the crop not
used for insurance premiums would still amount to more than
the farmer* s average production, and with a supported price,
the income from the crop should be reduced but little, it at
all. The release of commodities from storage in years of crop
failure would tend to hold down the price, but farmers without
a crop would not benefit from high prices. Furthermore, as
a form of price stabilization, this plan would require no
funds to buy up the commodity. The participating farmers
would provide the capital in the form of premium payment in
kind.
Price Situation in 1957
Up to midsummer of 1937, American business proceeded
with but brief and unimportant set-backs. By 1936,
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it appeared as if the economic revival might attain the
levels of 1929. While the general level of production in
the spring of 1937 was reaching the average normal of the
nineteen twenties, it must not be assumed that American
economic conditions were recovering all the ground lost in the
depression. Industrial production was almost as high as it
had been in 1929; yet, on the basis of past performances, it
should have been higher.
The general situation, nevertheless, appeared
encouraging. Cash income from the sale of farm products
and from government payments in 1937 totaled $8,521,000,000,
or about double the $4,328,000,000 from marketings in 1932,
the low of depression. It should also be noted, that as marketing
income improved, government payments tapered off. In 1934
and 1935, benefit payments were around $500,000,000 each
year, but in 193S they were $287,000,000 and in 1937,
$367,000,000. The index number of farm prices increased, as
prices received by farmers from 1935 to July 1937 went from
108 to 125. Ratio of prices received to prices paid went
from 88 to 94.
Recession of 1937
Suddenly in August 1937, a new depression hit America.
There were no advance warnings, as in the summer of 1929:
there were also no runaway stock market speculations nor
bank failures; no tightening of ca,pital available for bank
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loans and investments; no high interest level, nor sudden
collapse of European markets. Nevertheless, business activity
went into a sharp and steep decline, the drop continuing from
August 1937 to January 1938. The fall was more rapid than
it had been during 1929, but it never reached the low of 1932.
The decline in agricultural prices, and in value of the
farm dollar, was almost catastrophic. In May 1937, the
V
general index of all farm prices stood at 128; in May 1938,
it had dropped to 92. Cash income was $602,971,000 in 1938,
and $430,382,000 in 1937.
Second A. A. A. Adopted
In the middle of this second depression, or recession,
as it was called by the government leaders, the Second
Agricultural Adjustment Act was adopted. Under this act,
provision was made for production control, marketing quotas,
loan programs and various other price fixing devices covering
five basic commodities, cotton, corn, wheat, tobacco, and rice.
The production control features were tied up with those for
soil conservation, despite the inherent conflict between
these two objectives. The situation was described by Dr.
Martin as follows, 1 “The fundamental conflict between the
purposes of soil improvement and crop restriction has been
glossed over in the legislation, and this worthy, though in-
appropriate objective has been again used to justify payment
to farmers for their cooperation in creating a scarcity of
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farm products so as to raise prices. Obviously the current
alleged crop surpluses do not come from the depleted and
eroded soils, and if the major payments are really to be
made for improving soil fertility and prevention of soil
erosion in areas where this is most needed, an additional
surplus production capacity will be added to the supposedly
superfluous agricultural plant already existing. Hence,
the more rapidly soil conservation proceeds, the more dras-
tically will crops on existing fertile land have to be
curtailed. This is an exceptionally vicious circle for
balanced abundance advocates to contemplate."
Marketing Quotas
The Act provided that marketing quotas shall be
adopted whenever the "normal supply" of the designated
commodities is exceeded. An excess supply prevailed for
both cotton and tobacco, so a referenda was conducted among
the farmers a short time after the act was adopted. In both
cases more than two-thirds majority required by the law was
obtained and marketing quotas were instituted. This right to
conduct a referendum has been hailed as an example of
"economic democracy," and is supposed to indicate that the
program is adopted voluntarily. But when the rewards, benefit
payments, larger loans and avoidance of penalties for coopera-
tion are taken into consideration, it seems fairly clear that
1 National Industrial Conference Board Bulletin, April 12,
1938. Page 2.
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the price of non-cooperation is high, and that the farmer has
little choice. He is not actually free to decide whether or
not he wants to cooperate, since he receives a reward for
saying, 11 yes" and is severely penalized for saying, “no.”
Ever Normal granary
Closely related to these marketing quotas is the
ever-normal granary idea, which has been strongly advocated by
Secretary Wallace. The supply, in excess of that permitted
by the quotas, is to be stored until such time as need
warrants its utilization. Thus, large and small crops are.
to be averaged, and, according to this theory, wide price
swings are to be eliminated: the farmer will not receive
“ruinously” low prices in the years of bumper crops (or
depression) neither will the consumer have to pay the high
prices which result from droughts. In the event that large
supplies accumulate in the M granary”, the production control
features of the act may be called upon to keep the new supply
below current needs, and thus enable a release of part of
the stored products. Loans, to be made on such stored
commodities, will insure a flow of cash to the farmer and
make him more willing to cooperate in witholding stocks from
the market.
The loan program limits advances to between 52 per cent
and 75 per cent of the parity prices for wheat, corn, and
cotton. As under the original act, loans are made “without
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recourse." Non-cooperatives may obtain loans to an amount
which is only three fifths of that available to cooperators.
Furthermore, if the adoption of marketing quotas is rejected
by the farmers in any year, no loans will be made during the
following marketing year. An interesting innovation is
found in regard to corn loans, since they are to be determined
in part by the relationship between production and the "normal
year*s domestic consumption and exports." Thus, when pro-
duction exceeds normal consumption by not more than 10 per
cent, the loan is to be 70 per cent of the parity price,
while an excess production of more than 25 per cent lowers
the loan to only 52 per cent. This provision gives recog-
nition to the inverse relationship which exists between
supply and price and should act as partial restraint upon
the granting of excessive loans.
Provision was also made for the continuation of the
Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation until June 30, 1942.
It will be recalled that this corporation was organized to
purchase price-depressing agricultural surpluses and to
encourage domestic consumption.
Section V
Results of American Governmental Planning
Has all this planning by the Government achieved the
desired goal? ^as it helped to raise the price of agricultural
products to the purchasing power of the base period, namely,
1910-1914? Has the A. A. A. attained its primary objective, -
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to restore the farmer^ income through the attainment of
parity prices for his products? Have the price fixing
devices, namely production controls, marketing agreements,
loan programs and surplus removal operations accomplished
their aim? As the record now stands the prices for farm
products with the exception of meats are disastrously low.
The wide flung activities of the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration has been unable to support the price structure
for staples.
Results of Government Measure s
To try to estimate the effects of the various farm
measures passed by Congress to adjust the farm prices to
parity would be extremely difficult »for as has been observed,
reduced supplies of farm products, dollar evaluation, and
improved business activity all had important bearing on farm
price advance during the period between 1932 and 1935. In
the case of cotton and tobacco, the rise in price can be
traced to the reduction of supplies as the result of the ad-
justment programs.
In analyzing the results of these programs, the years
between 1932 and the present may be divided into three
sections; first, the period between 1932 and 1935, second,
the period between 1935 and 1937, and third, the period from
January 1938 up to the present time.
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First Period - 1932 fro 1935 - Improvement
During the three year period immediately following
the passage of the first Agricultural Adjustment Act, in
1933, agriculture functioned through a governmental agency.
Farm incomes rose 58 per cent, the price index rose from
65 per cent in 1932 to 70 per cent in 1933, 90 percent in
1934, and 108 per cent in 1935. Ratio of prices received
to prices paid rose from 61 per cent in 1932 to 86 per cent
in 1935. Increased buying power during those years was
translated into increased business activity throughout the
nation. This improvement is shown in the index figures
found in the Yean Books of Agriculture for those periods.
Between 1929 and 1932, the contribution of agriculture to
the National income had declined from slightly more than 10
per cent to 7.5 per cent, but reports indicate that in 1935,
agriculture contributed about 10.6 per cent of the total
national income. Yet 1935 net farm income did not give the
farmers the purchasing power equal to that of persons living
in the cities, and furthermore 1935 benefit payments only
reduced disparity by about $480,000,000. To further reduce
this disparity, the government was forced to make further
payments* Cash receipts have shown marked improvement from
1932, while receipts in 1935 were only two thirds as large
as in 1929.
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Cash receipts from sale of principal fejrm products by
1
regions.
Region
North Atlanfc ic States
Percent
1932
54
Receipts (were of 1929)
1935
72 £
South Atlantic States 42 76
South Central States 38 63
East North Central States 44 73
West North Central States 36 57
Western States 43 69
United States 41 66
As the result of various activities on the part of
the Government, the yearly average price for all groups of
farm products increased 66 per cent during the three year
period 1932 to 1935, moving from 65 to 108 per cent of the
pre-war level. The low point occurred in llarch 1933, when
farm prices were only 55 per cent of the pre-war level,
while in December 1935, they averaged 110 per cent of the
pre-war level. These figures do not include rental and
benefit payments.
Prices of Basic Commodities
A review of the prices of basic commodities for this
2period® shows the following results on farm prices and their
relation to parity prices for the period from 1910 to 1914.
1 Agricultural Adjustment 1933 - 1935. Page 5
2 'Year Book of Agriculture 1936. p. 1151.
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Cotton: The 1934 world consumption of American cotton was
about 28,000,000 bales less than 1932 - 1933. The average
price per pound of lint received by producers for the 1934 -
1935 crop was 11.1 cents as compared with 6.5 cents for
the 1932-1933 crop. In 1932, farmers received 7.6 cents
per pound and in 1935 they received 11.6 cents per pound.
Hogs: The emergency hog-purchase program removed more than
6,000,000 pigs from the market in 1933. This emergency
plan had the effect of maintaining prices at a level higher
than otherwise would have been the case. As a result of
this act, the farmer received $8.36 in 1935, as compared with
$3.44 in 1932.
Dairy Products: The dairy industry experienced further
gains in the economic recovery which began in 1933. It had
a price index of 108, which was about 20 per cent better
than 1933, although 45 per cent below 1929. The average for
dairy products as a group in December 1935 was 118 per cent
of the per-war level and 94 per cent of parity, as compared
with only 65 per cent of parity in March 1933.
Truck crops: Truck crops had not proven satisfactory to
growers during this period. Production declined from the
1924 - 1929 average in 1932 to approximately 107 per cent
in 1933; the upward trend was resumed in 1934; and in 1935
was about 16 per cent greater than the average for the period
1924 to 1929. With production in 1935 larger by 16 per cent
than the level for 1924 - 1929, and the money income of city
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consumers lowered, low prices could be expected.
Rice: Prices rose from 42 cents a bushel for 1932 to 70.1
cents in December 1935. The 1936 Year Book of Agriculture
reports that the rice grower received from the miller only
the market price of rice, and that his shane of the benefits
of the program was paid in the first adjustment payment of
one half cent per pound and the second payment at half of
that rate.
Cattle: The average farm price for beef cattle per hundred
weight in 1933 was $3.63, while in 1935, it was $6.21. The
crought and crop value caused a rise in beef cattle prices.
In 1934 cattle on farms showed 74,262,000 head, with meat
at $3.63 per hundred pounds, with a price that was 59.02
per cent of fair value. In 1935 cattle on farms estimated
at 68,529, with $6.21 per hundred weight, which was 93.10
per cent of fair exchange value. During the year cattle
prices averaged from 15 to 52 cents below parity.
Wheat: The average farm price of 90 cents a bushel in
December, 1935 was more than double the average farm price
of 38 cents a bushel in 1933. Production in the three year
period was below normal, because of lower yields and drought.
After the A. A. A. was passed, the wheat adjustment program
attempted to reduce production. In 1935, 66,000,000 acres
were seeded with a production of 603,000,000 bushde, whereas
in 1934, 60,371,000 acres were seeded with a production of
496,929,000 bushels. Due to the drought and dust storms of
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July of that year, the restriction on production was taken off.
In 1933 the average price for wheat was 58 cents a bushel, while
in 1935, it was 86 cents. In 1933, wheat was 71 cents below
parity, in 1935 it was 21.
Sugar: Growers have received better prices for their crops,
and these better prices have been augmented by benefit pay-
ments. The 1935 crop farm price of Louisians sugar was
$3.19 a ton while the average price for the 1934 crop had
been only $2.33. In 1932, Louisiana farmers had received an
average of $3.06 a ton, and in 1933 they received an average
of $3.24. The 1935 average price for sugar beets was around
$5.15 a ton, compared with the average price for the 1934
crop of $5.16, and in 1933 it averaged $5.13.
Since 1933, the prices received by farmers for their
products have risen more than the prices of things farmers
usually buy. 1 In 1933 the general level of farm commodity
prices was only 55 per cent of the pre-war average whereas the
prices of the things that farmers buy had dropped only to 100
per cent of the pre-war average. In other words, farm
commodities per unit had only 55 per cent of parity prices.
Price Relationship Improved
In the two year period ending February 1935 the general
level of farm prices more than doubled, which coupled with
1 Agricultural Adjustment 1933 - 1935. p. 9
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lower production costs put the farmer in the strongest
financial position since 1932*
From the standpoint of price relationship, the agricul-
tural situation seemed fairly good in 1935. In September,
the index of prices received by farmers was 107 per cent of
the pre-war average, as compared with 103 in September 1934
and 55 in March, 1933, which was the lowest month on record.
This gain in two years of nearly 100 per cent exclusive of
benefit payments brought the purchasing power to about 84
per cent of parity. For 14 of the basic commodities named
in the A* A« A. the index number in September 1935 was 110
per cent of pre-war level as compared with 107 for all farm
products.
One reason for the apparently satisfactory price re-
lationship was the 1934 drought. As a result of the drought,
farm commodity prices advanced late in 1934 and early in
1935, without a proportionate increase in farm returns. Crop
failure, while it increases farm prices, does not increase
farm income. During this period, the government was seek-
ing the return of parity prices through the expansion of
consumer buying power, and not through crop failures due to
weather.
During the period between 1932 and 1935, the goal of
government planning was to attain parity prices, which would
be achieved by balancing production and increasing consumer
requirements. Later the parity price concept was changed in
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favor of parity income.
Summary - First Period 1952 - 1955
To summarize briefly, the results of Government control
over farm prices, during the period from 1932 to 1935, show
an increase of almost $3,000,000,000 in farm income in 1935
as compared with 1932, which indicates that the program was
to that extent effective. Part of this increased income,
however, may be traced to the devaluation of the dollar, which
affected agricultural prices more than industrial prices;
also to various other new deal activities as well as to
adverse weather conditions, and to the natural forces of
recovery which were operative during this period. The major
portion of the increase attributed to the A. A. A. was due to
the production control program. The price inducements and
benefit payments resulting from these controls aggregated
almost a billion dollars as compared with net additions of
less than twenty-f ive million dollars attributable to the
marketing agreements#
Second Period 1936 - 1937. Upward Trend in Farm Prices
The year 1936 saw an upward trend in farm income.
Cash farm income was around $8,100,000,000 or nearly double what
it had been in 1932. Income advanced 12 per cent in a year,
expenses increased only 6 per cent. The income realized by
the farmer for his work and capital in 1936 had a purchasing
poy/er higher than any income of the last thirteen years for
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which these income estimates were available.
The index for wholesale prices in 1935 was 117; in
1936, 118. Prices paid by farmers for commodities used in
living and production were 124 and 126. In 1936 they were
122 and 126.
Index numbers of farm prices. 1
Year Grains Cotton Fruits Truck Crops Meat Animals Ratio
1935 103 101 91 127 118 86
1936 108 100 100 113 121 92
Ratio of Prices Received to Prices Paid, Rose .
The ratio between prices received, and prices paid the
farmers rose between 1935 - 1936. Farm commodity prices have
risen more since 1933, than the prices of non-farm goods and
services, although previously, the trend had been in the
opposite direction. In March 1933 with agricultural prices
only 55 per cent of the pre-war average, non-agricultural
prices were still at 100 per cent of this level. Farm products
in 1935 averaged 108 per cent of pre-war prices, while non-
agricultural prices had risen to 125 per cent. Farm prices
had gained on non-farm prices, but had not attained pre-war
parity. The index of faim commodity purchasing power was 55
pea? cent of pre-war in March 1933, 73 per cent for the year
1 Year Book of Agriculture 1936. p. 1152
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1934, and 86 per cent for the year 1935 and in August 1936 it
had climbed to 98 per cent.
Corn producers for the year 1936 received 94 cents a
bushel, as against 76 cents in the previous year; oats
paid 34.3 cents per bushel in 1936, and 39.3 in 1935; wheat
paid 96.4 cents per bushel in 1936, as against 86.4 cents
in 1935; potatoes sold for 99.8 a bushel in 1936 and 49.4
in 1935; cotton producers received 11.7 cents a pount in
1936, and 11.6 in 1935; beef cattle paid $6.91 per hundred
in 1936 against $6.24 in 1935. As a matter of fact, prac-
tically all the farm products were higher in price during
1936 than in 1935.
Summary - Second Period - 1936 to 1937
There was an increase in prices and income of 1936
over 1935. This increase may be partly attributed to the
fact that consumer purchasing power increased. The index of
national income in 1936 was 82, as compared with 71 in 1935.
The 1936 edition of the Agricultural Conservation Reports
states, "that the farmers share of the consumer f s dollar
was 42 per cent in 1935, 33 per cent in 1932, and 47 per cent
in 1929."
During the latter part of 1936, in the second year
of agricultural adjustment, under the Soil Conservation and
Adjustment Act, farm prices rapidly declined.
•
• ...
. .50
' '
.
: . ... *
.
. * ,
. :
j.-> u ; J3, « :
-
•
••
f i ! v. ; . i .50.' . i •: at • £. it; .fl
.
'c
i o .
1
.
,
.
‘
•
O • ! i ,
t
. (
109
Index of Prices received by farmers for period from 1933
to January 1, 1938.^
Ratio of prices
received to
Year Grain Cotton Fruits Truck Crops Dairy prices paid
1933 62 64 74 103 82 64
1934 93 99 100 125 95 73
1935 103 101 91 111 108 86
1936 108 100 100 123 119 92
1937 126 95 122 104 124 93
Jan • 1
1938 91 66 70 101 128 81
In 1938 the prices of farm products have declined
from the 1937 high point. The ratio of wholesale prices of
farm products to wholesale prices of non-agricultural pro-
ducts for the week ending January 8, 1938, was 82 per cent
of the pre-war level, compared with 101 for the corresponding
week a year ago#
The general level of prices received by farmers in
December was 104 per cent of pre-war prices, compared with
107 in November, and 126 in December 1936.
o
Index Numbers of Prices Received and Paid by Farmers#"*
Year Month Prices Received Prices Paid
Buying Power of
farm products
1937 August 123 132 93
it September 118 130 91
ii October 112 128 88
it November 107 127 84
ii December 104 126 83
1 The Agricultural Situation Feb. 1938. p. 24 •
2 Agricultural Situation - Sept. 1938.
..
•- » .
—
'
.
asex
r 4- ovr.ri •/;, ’
. ; 3 :ir
- rl
. o •;
t
• -
V
.'OX • • J
t .. V .! * - xi
.
’ 5
. jc fur
,
jc/ ocj'i ’• o /"cv . one iir
.
- j *. •
- .1 . >i , : \
-
’ r
>
>
.
10 C.. : .
<t
.
*
110
Factors Effecting Price Recession *
The causes of the recession which began in July 1937,
and continued through 1938 up to the present time are as
follows:
1. Government spending of borrowed money first
started prices upward.
2. Congress’s giving the bonus to veterans helped
temporary business advancement. With the money
spent, business again receded.
3. European war talk and armament plans added another
artificial factor.
4. Rising of commodity prices.
5. Price rises caused labor to demand more wages
and shorter hours.
6. Government curtailing various spending projects.
All these factors have directly or indirectly affected the
rise and fall of farm prices.
Third Period-- 1938 to 1939. Prices Dropped to Level of 1933 .
In 1939 after we have seen six years of planning,
with three farm control ^acts passed, for the purpose of
abolishing surpluses and raising prices. The evidence of the
sixth full year is hardly calculated to strengthen the case
for agricultural planning. Despite the fact that most of the
emergency supporting devices of the 1938 farm act were called
into play during the year, cotton in the last twelve months
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has fallen to the lowest level since 1933, - corn has fallen
to the lowest level since 1933, - wheat has made a new low
since 1932. The table below shows the prices of nine of the
country* s principal commercial agricultural products, as of
May 15, 1933 when the original A. A. A. was set up at their
lows for 1938 and as of December 30, 1938.
1Prices of Farm Products
5-year
average, Parity
Product
August
1909-July
1914
Decem-
ber
1909-13
Decem-
ber 1937
Novem-
ber 1938
Decem-
ber 1938
price,
Decem-
ber 1938
Cotton, lb -cents- 12.4 12.2
27.67 8.52 8.20 15.5
Corn,bu»-r~r-
—
- do 64.2 57.7 48.5 40.0 43.1 80.2
Wheat ,bu - do 88.4 86.7 83.6 52.0 53.6 110.5
Hay, ton -dollars 11.87 11.90 8.79 6.82 6.81 14.84
Potatoes,bu--cents- 69.7 62.3 53.0 54.7 61.4 85.4
Oat s
,
bu - do 39.9 38.3 29.1 22.5 24.4 49.9
Soybeans,bu-- do a) a) .83 .63 .67
Peanuts, lb - do 4.8 4.6 3.2 3.3 3.3 6.0
Beef
,
cattle, cwt . dol . 5.21 5.03 6.08 6.32 6.40 6.51
Hogs,cwt dollars 7.22 6.73 7.54 7.25 6.90 9.02
Chickens, lb--cents- 11.4 10.6 16.4 13.6 13.6 14.2
EggS , do Ztttt- do 21.5 29.9 26.0 29.0 27.9 340.7
Butt erfat ,lt- do 26.3 29.9 38.4 20.5 27.0 335.9
Wool
,
lb - do 18.3 18.6 23.6 20.5 20.2 22.9
Veal calves, cwt. dol . 6.75 6.74 8.09 8.27 8.04 8.44
Lambs
,
cwt —dollars 5.87 5.52 7.48 6.82 7.08 7.34
Horses, each- do 136.60 132.10 286.00 79.40 79.80 170.80
1 Prices not available. 2 Revised. 2 Adjusted for seasonality.
1 Agricultural Situation Jan. 1939.
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This table clearly shows that parity prices have not
been reached, chickens being the only exception. Beef, however,
is close to the desired goal of $6.51 with the market price
of $6.40 in December 1958. Compared to the parity period
of 1909-1914, the 1938 December prices clearly show that all
crops other than cattle, hogs, and chickens have failed to
attain the desired goal.
Cotton production this year estimated at 12,200,000 bales
is very moderate when measured against what was considered
normal before the advent of crop control. It represents less
than the world consumption of American cotton for ten of the
twelve season ending with 1933-1934. World cotton consumption
has increased markedly since 1929, but American cotton has
failed to retain its share of the expanding market. In the
1937-1938 crop season world consumption was 1,000,000 bales
larger than it was in 1929, but while consumption of foreign
growths was increasing by 5,250,000 bales, consumption of
American cotton was declining 4,250,000 bales.
Cotton Control Collapsed
Unfortunately there does not appear to be any early
relief in sight. For the new year, the cotton acreage quota
has been placed at 27,000,000 to 29,000,000 acres; or about
the same as last year. Given approximately the same relative
yield, this would leave the situation little changed at the
end of the 1939 season, with the government still holding
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some 11,000,000 bales of cotton. The extent to which crop
control in cotton has failed to date can be appreciated when
it is recalled that the Farm Board at the peak of its opera-
tions held less than 40 per cent as much cotton as the govern-
ment is now holding.
Wheat Unsatisfactory
The wheat situation, while definitely unsatisfactory,
is not comparable in seriousness to that of cotton, as the
latter is complicated by the reliance of producers on foreign
markets. At the beginning of the last crop year, there was a
carry over of 154,000,000 bushels, and the 1938 surplus added
another 150,000,000 bushels. Unhappily, the American crop
coincided with large crops in Canada, Europe, and Argentina,
with the result that there were, approximately, two bushels
of export wheat available for every one that was needed.
These devices have been employed to support the wheat:
namely, mandatory loans, ranging from 60 cents a bushel on
the farm to 77 cents at Chicago; export subsidies running
to 17 cents a bushel at Chicago; and a drastic program of
acreage allotment for the 1939 crop.
Corn Normal
The corn crop at 2,460,000 bushels is about normal,
although, it is large in relation to animal stocks. The
only support available for corn during the last year was a
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57 cent loan authorized at a time when corn on the farm was
selling at about 35 cents.
Livestock Satisfactory
Livestock is doing fairly well. Steers averaged $5.15
against more than twice that figure in November 1938; hogs
averaged $4.10 against $7.70; and lambs $6.65 as compared with
$8.85.
Summary - Third Period 1938 - 1939
Situation at Close of 1938
The year 1938 ended with the index of prices of farm
products at 96 per cent of pre-war prices, the highest since
last March. The index for all products combined for the full
year 1938 was 95 per cent of pre-war. This compares with
121 in 1937 which was the highest since 1930. The ratio of
prices received to prices paid by farmers in 1938 averaged 77
per cent of pre-war as compared with 93 in 1937.
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Index Numbers of Prices Received and Paid by Farmers.
1
Buying Power of
Year Month Prices Received Prices Paid Farm Products
1937 December 104 126 83
1938 January 102 126 81
" February 97 126 77
11 March 96 125 77
" April 94 125 75
M May 92 125 74
11 June 92 124 74
11 July 95 123 77
“ August 92 122 75
M September 95 121 79
" October 95 121 79
" November 94 121 78
” December 96 120 80
1 The Agricultural Situation, January 1939, Page 3
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Prices of Farm Products1
Five Year
Product average
1909-1914
Dec.
1909-1913
Dec.
1937
Dec.
1938
Parity
Price
Dec. 1938
Cotton lb. 12.4 12.2 7.67 8.20 15.5
Corn bu. 64.2 57.7 48.5 43.1 80.2
Wheat bu. 88.4 86.7 83.6 53.
6
110.5
Hay ton 11.87 11.99 8.79 6.81 14.84
Potatoes 66.7 62.3 53. 61.4 85.4
Oats 39.9 38.3 29.1 24 .
4
49.9
Soy beans .83 .67
Peanuts 4.8 4.6 3.2 3.3 6.
Beef Cattle
dollars 5.21 5.03 6.08 6.40 6.51
Hogs cwt. 7.22 6.73 7.54 6.90 9.02
Chickens lb. 11.4 10.6 16.4 13.6 14.2
Eggs Doz. 21.5 29.9 26. 27.9 40.7
Butt erfat lb. 26.3 29.9 38.4 27. 35.9
Veal, Calves
cwt. 6.75 6.74 8.09 8.04 8.44
Lambs Cwt.
dollars 5.85 5.52 7.48 7.08 7.34
Wool bale 18.3 18.6 23.6 20.2 22.9
1 Agricultural Situation, January 1939, page 3
..
%
.
.
r* ft
*
I, . • .
.
. •
*
.
*
»
. .
.
*
* *
.
. .
-
*
- fmj, •r-J.-r.
«
iqo : i
.
.
*
.
.
4<*fA
.
aljscf loo
117
The general level of prices received by farmers in 1938,
at 95 per cent of the pre-war average, was more than 20 per
cent below the 1937 level, when the index averaged 121. All
groups of commodities declines in 1938, but in varying degrees.
Prices of grains and fruits dropped about 40 per cent; cotton
and miscellaneous commodities 26 per cent; whereas, prices of
chickens and eggs were only 3 per cent below the 1937 level.
The decline in income from farm marketings, in December of
this year, were considerably relieved by the 8 million dollars
more paid out this year than last.
Government Price Raising Measures Unsuccessful
Evidently, the price raising measures adopted by the
government in its attempt to alleviate the plight of the
farmer have not been successful, and the farmers are crying for
more subsidies. With few exceptions, farm prices are below
the prices of the base period, 1910-1914. The three major
crops, wheat, cotton, and corn around which the A. a. A.
program has been built, are now selling below the average
prices of the five years preceding the new deal, and are
nowhere near parity prices. This, despite the fact that the
A. A. A. program has been five years ih operation.
Situation at Beginning of 1939 .
The New York Times of January 22, 1939, stated that
at the sixty-eighth annual meeting of the Kansas State
Board of Agriculture, the members passed the following reso-
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lution, “Our nation cannot survive, much less achieve an
enduring prosperity if it maintains a high price level for
industry, a high wage level for labor, and a price level
for agriculture on a much lower plane than for the other two
major economic groups. The parity price concept for agriculture
as embodied in legislation now on the statute books, recognizes
the fact that only by free exchange of goods and services among
groups on a fair price and income basis, can we hope to achieve
and maintain prosperity. America needs an economic balance
which will assure security for labor, stability for industry,
and parity for agriculture* 11
On the same date, namely January 22, 1939, the Times
also reports a meeting at Omaha, Nebraska, of representatives
of 100,000 farmers, who went on record as follows, “They
intended to assure their farmers that they will receive
a price sufficient to pay all the cost of producing the
crops, all the overhead of the farm, and in addition, wage
and managerial compensation to the farmer and the working
members of his family. «'
A . A. A. Failed to Establish Parity .
Evidently the passage of the original A. A. A. act
and subsequent additions has not as yet been able to establish
and maintain a balance between production and consumption of
agricultural commodities. Its purpose has not been fulfilled,
since the farmers have not enjoyed a purchasing power for
agricultural commodities equal to the base period of 1910-1914.
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The farmer has not received parity prices under the Government
started in 1933*
The 1939 Agricultural Act, with its ever normal granary
plan is not working out according to a report in the Boston
Globe of January 24, 1939. Throughout the South, warehouses
are piled high with cotton while, in the midwest and Pacific
Coast, wheat belts, elevators, and farm bins are burdened with
supplies. The quantity of corn harvested in the fall was so
large, that thousands of farmers had to build new cribs.
Elsewhere in the nation there are stored unusually large
quantities of certain types of tobacco, butter, citrus fruits,
wool, and truck crops.
To the city consumer, these huge stocks are a guarantee
against scarcity and high prices. To the warehouseman, they
mean a bountiful return in storage fees. To the farmer, they
simply mean price depressing surpluses. To Congress and
the Administration, they signify trouble, - farmer demands
for greater subsidies from the Treasury to supplement reduced
incomes, - or a new farm program.
Section VI. Planning Concept
When I first selected this subject for my thesis, I
was of the opinion that the solution of the price problem,
for the farmer, depended upon a cohtinuance of the policies
instituted by the Government in 1933. Of all the solutions
to the problem, none is more plausible than planned economy.
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Everyone likes to talk about a plan, and when the word
economy is added, it implies that spending will be done wisely.
Production Should Balance Consumption
The fundamental idea behind planning is, that there shall
be a balance between production and consumption, - that a
nation shall produce only the goods which it can itself consume,
or for which it has a sure market abroad; and that it shally
buy from foreign countries, only those articles which it
cannot, itself, produce. It implies the planning of national
life in the interest of the nation as a whole. This means
that those industries and branches of agriculture which today
produce too much must reduce their production. Those which
produce too little must either increase their output, or must
be supplemented by imports. This is so reasonable that it
seems presumptuous to question it. If production can be made
to balance consumption, - if the farmers and manufacturers
can be assured a market for all their goods at profitable
prices, - most of the nation’s economic problem could easily
be solved. Here would be security of the best kind, - security
of employment for workers, security of profits for employers,
and security of income for investors. There would be no more
depressions nor booms. Instead, there would be a balanced
plenty, a perfect economic equilibrium based on reason rather
than on greed, on forethought and coordination, instead of on
selfish competition.
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Planning Board Necessary
Planned economy involves some kind of plan. A plan
calls for a board of planners. The planners faced with the
task of planning the economic life of 130,000,000 persons
of different occupations, different origins, and living under
different climatic and economic conditions, must be men of
phenomenal intelligence. After assembling and amassing the
basic factual material about production, the board would have
to acquire a complete understanding of the nation 1 s transpor-
tation problems and of existing and potential machinery of
distribution. From this point it would have to pass on to the
study of the needs and wants of the consuming public, of
their spending habits, and, their individual incomes. With
all this information thoroughly digested, the board would then
have to ration production in all lines, and assign every
producer of each kind of article, an exact quota. So also,
it would have to regulate consumption, for an increase or
decrease in the planned consumption would throw the whole
system out of balance.
Successful Planning Requires Government Control
Eventually planning, in order to be successful, implies
government control over the entire economic activities of
the nation. Professor R. Gr. Tugwell, writing on this subject
in the American Economic Review in 1932, said, “Planning will
necessarily become a function of the Federal government; either
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that, or the planning agency will supersede that government.”
At the present time, this theory of planned economy
is put into practice on a large scale in Russia, Germany,
and Italy; and already on the American statute books are
numerous laws based on the philosophy and embodying these
principles.
In Germany
,
agriculture is now so completely planned,
that the farmer* s actions are directed and closely super-
vised by government agents. These men visit every farm in
Germany to see that the farmer brings into the Nazi marketing
agency all that he produces. Fixed prices are set for each
article by the government bureaucrats in Berlin. If a farmer
wants to retain for his own use even a pint of milk, he must
buy it back from the government agent to whom he delivered it.
He is obliged to fertilize and sow his own acres as directed
by the government agents. If he fails to operate the farm
as the government supervisor believes it should be operated,
the property can be confiscated by the government, and the
former owner can be forced to work his former farm as a
servant of the government.
Even in Germany, many farmers refuse to live up to
the rigid quota system. As a result, there is much “bootlegging**
of foodstuffs and it has been estimated that as much as one-
third of all food produced, is sold surreptitiously.
In America, the same principles have been applied, al-
though less rigidly and arbitrarily. The American experi-
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ments with planned economy began with the logical procedure
of temporarily reducing the output of certain crops of which
there was a great oversupply, due to the closing of European
and domestic markets. The first controls applied to wheat,
corn and hogs
,
tobacco, and cotton. Almost at once, unforseen
complications arose. When farmers agreed to reduce their
customary acreage in one of these crops, they naturally looked
around for other productive uses for the land taken out of their
usual crops. As one after another, they turned to other crops,
an oversupply of these new crops was soon threatened. Immediately,
those farmers, whose livelihood had depended on these crops
demanded that controls be extended, so that farmers turning to
new specialties, would not force down prices, nor ruin long
established producers of these specialties.
Sunnly and Demand Determine Price
As a matter of fact, history of attempted price fixing,
in the past has not been successful. Price is determined at
the point where the marginal supply price is equal, and the
minimum number of changes can take place. The marginal
demand price is determined by consumer^ desire and purchasing
power, while the marginal supply price is based upon sellers
costs and holding power. If prices are to be controlled,
each one of the four factors mentioned must be carefully
regulated. If one factor is left free, the control of the
other three may prove fruitless, and the entire price fixing
scheme may be upset.
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Government Cannot Control Costs and Desires
It is theoretically possible for the holding power
of producers and the purchasing power of consumers to be
strongly influenced by the government; but it seems im-
possible for a similar control to be effected over costs and
desires. Desires reflect a composite of tastes, environment,
feelings, habits, and physical constitution; it is, therefore,
almost impossible to determine, with any degree of effectiveness,
what they will be. Attempts may be made to condition desire
through advertising campaigns, or through educational talks.
Complete control, however, cannot be achieved, despite the
broad appeals to mass psychology.
Natural Regulation of Surpluses
The first A. A. A. attempted to regulate supply by
controlling production and reducing acreage, but did not taice
into consideration the fact that Nature could not or would
not be regulated. For instance despite a substantial reduction
in acreage devoted to planting of cotton in 1933, the total
output was slightly greater than that of the preceeding year,
due to abundant sunshine and frequent rain. On the other hand,
when nature becomes niggardly crops are scarce despite man-
made laws formulated to increase production. It is this
problem of unexpected and uncontrollable large supply which
leads to demand by producers that something must be done to
eliminate the depressing effects of bumper crops on prices.
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Control Possible Only in Regimented State
The impossibility of controlling desires and the level
of costs, accounts for some of the difficulty of controlling
prices. Of course, in a regimented economy, where people
are forced to accept the will of the dictator, and where they
are forbidden to express their individual choices, desires
tend to have much less significance. In the competitive
economy, however, utilities and costs must be balanced. Costs
will not be incurred for any length of time unless compensat-
ing satisfactions are obtained. Under a regimented economy,
this question is not so important; therefore, prices, which
have no relation to values can be fixed and enforced. In
democratic states, this regimentation is impossible — hence,
price fixing schemes tend to fail.
Economic System Interrelated
Our economic system is closely interrelated, and the
relation between the various industries has become so close
that any action affecting the supply or price of the product
of one tends also to affect other industries. Thus, if the
price of butter were fixed relatively low, and that of cheese
left unregulated, more milk might be used to make cheese, - if
it should become profitable to do so. This weakness in
production control led to an extension of control under the
1933 Act, and the 1938 act goes still further.
Industry Must be Socialized
In order to prevent the maladjustments which would
be created in other sections of the economic system because
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of the price fixing experiment, it is necessary to control
not only the price of the product, but also its supply and
demand as well as the price and output of every other product
and service which is affected by changes in the price con-
trolled goods. This means, in effect, a socialization of
industry*
Economic Planning LIust Be Conducted on World-./ide Basis
Finally, no economic planning can be effective unless
it is conducted on a world wide basis. Raw materials are
unevenly distributed among nations. Keen international
competition in many lines of industry determines world prices.
Hence the efforts of a single nation to plan its economic
activities are affected not only by its dependence on foreign
sources for raw materials, but also by the internal reaction
to world prices. Herein lies one of the greatest obstacles
in the way of all economic planning. Of what use is it for the
American government to hold down the size of the American
cotton crop, a specific instance of economic planning, if,
as a result of this policy, the cotton growers of Brazil
and Egypt find it profitable to double their output? By
paying subsidies to the American cotton farmers, it is possible
to crea.te a temporary illusion of prosperity. But as a
measure of permanent economic recovery, this plan is doomed
to fail because it is dependent on world forces which the
American government cannot possibly control.
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Conclusion
Impossible as is a government directed, planned
economy, it does not mean that all planning about the
economic development of the country is futile. However,
it is essential that planning begin from the ground up; that it
be carried on not only by localities by states and by regions,
but also internationally. Only when a great amount of further
research has been completed can any effective coordination be
made, and practical suggestions deduced for national guidance.
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